Kiseskey v. Carpenters' Trust for Southern California
144 Cal. App. 3d 222, 192 Cal. Rptr. 492, 1983 Cal. App. LEXIS 1865 (1983)
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Rule of Law:
For a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the statute of limitations begins to run when the defendant's conduct causes the plaintiff to suffer emotional distress that is 'severe,' not when the defendant's outrageous conduct occurs.
Facts:
- Union agent Douglas McCarron, on behalf of Carpenters Local Union No. 1506, telephoned Peter Kiseskey on October 17, 1977.
- During the call, McCarron insulted Kiseskey and threatened to put him in the hospital if he did not sign an agreement with the union.
- McCarron called Kiseskey again on November 20, 1977, threatening Kiseskey's life if he did not rejoin the union.
- On December 20, 1977, McCarron called a third time, threatening the well-being of Kiseskey's wife and children.
- The alleged threats were part of a continuous course of conduct intended to cause Kiseskey emotional distress.
- On January 9, 1978, Peter Kiseskey suffered a heart attack, which he alleged was a direct result of the severe emotional distress caused by the union's conduct.
- Peter Kiseskey's wife, Susan Kiseskey, subsequently sought damages for loss of consortium.
Procedural Posture:
- Peter and Susan Kiseskey filed a complaint in a California trial court against Carpenters Local Union No. 1506 and its agents.
- The Kiseskeys filed five amended complaints.
- The defendant union filed a general demurrer to the fifth amended complaint, arguing the claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations.
- The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer without leave to amend, dismissing the case.
- The Kiseskeys, as appellants, appealed the order of dismissal to the California Court of Appeal.
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Issue:
Does a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress accrue, for statute of limitations purposes, when the plaintiff's emotional distress becomes severe, rather than at the time of the defendant's outrageous conduct?
Opinions:
Majority - McClosky, Acting P. J.
Yes. A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff’s emotional distress becomes severe, not at the time of the defendant's underlying outrageous conduct. The court reasoned that 'severe emotional distress' is an essential element of the tort itself. Unlike torts such as battery, which are complete upon the wrongful act, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is not complete until the plaintiff's suffering reaches a sufficient level of severity. In this case, Kiseskey alleged that his distress culminated in a heart attack on January 9, 1978. Because the complaint was filed within one year of that date, it was timely. The court concluded that determining the precise moment the distress became 'severe' is a question of fact for a jury, and cannot be decided against the plaintiff on a demurrer.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the accrual rule for the statute of limitations in intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) cases. By tying the start of the limitations period to the plaintiff's suffering of 'severe' distress rather than the defendant's act, the court protects plaintiffs in situations of ongoing harassment where the harm is cumulative. This creates a more fact-intensive inquiry, potentially extending the time for a plaintiff to file a claim, as the focus shifts from the timing of the defendant's conduct to the timing of the resulting injury's severity. It establishes that a major physical manifestation of stress, like a heart attack, can mark the point of accrual for the cause of action.
