Kisela v. Hughes
584 U.S. 100, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 2066, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018)
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Rule of Law:
Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity from excessive force claims under the Fourth Amendment unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable officer would have known, requiring highly specific precedent, particularly in rapidly evolving situations.
Facts:
- In May 2010, a 911 caller reported that Amy Hughes was hacking a tree with a kitchen knife and acting erratically.
- Police officers Andrew Kisela, Alex Garcia, and Lindsay Kunz responded to the scene, where the 911 caller flagged them down and confirmed Hughes' erratic behavior and description.
- Officer Garcia spotted Sharon Chadwick standing next to a car in a driveway, separated from the officers by a chain-link fence with a locked gate.
- Hughes emerged from her house carrying a large kitchen knife at her side, matching the description, and walked toward Chadwick, stopping no more than six feet from her.
- All three officers drew their guns and, at least twice, commanded Hughes to drop the knife; however, Hughes did not acknowledge their presence or drop the knife, though she appeared calm.
- Officer Kisela, with his line of fire partially blocked by the fence, dropped to the ground and shot Hughes four times through the fence.
- After the shooting, officers learned that Hughes and Chadwick were roommates, Hughes had a history of mental illness, and was upset with Chadwick over a $20 debt, and Chadwick later stated she did not feel endangered by Hughes at any time.
Procedural Posture:
- Amy Hughes sued Officer Andrew Kisela in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
- The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Officer Kisela.
- Hughes appealed the District Court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (as the appellant).
- The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's grant of summary judgment, holding that Kisela's actions violated the Fourth Amendment and that the violation was clearly established.
- Officer Kisela filed a petition for rehearing en banc with the Ninth Circuit, which was denied over the dissent of seven judges.
- Officer Kisela then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does a police officer violate clearly established Fourth Amendment law, entitling them to qualified immunity, when they use deadly force against an individual holding a large kitchen knife, who has been described as acting erratically, takes steps toward another person, and ignores commands to drop the weapon, in a situation unfolding in a matter of seconds?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No, a police officer does not violate clearly established Fourth Amendment law, and is therefore entitled to qualified immunity, when they use deadly force in a rapidly unfolding situation where an individual holding a large kitchen knife, described as acting erratically, takes steps toward another person, and ignores commands to drop the weapon, because existing precedent did not make it 'beyond debate' that such specific conduct was unlawful. The Court held that even assuming a Fourth Amendment violation occurred—a proposition it found 'not at all evident'—Kisela was entitled to qualified immunity because his conduct did not violate clearly established law. Qualified immunity requires that existing precedent place the statutory or constitutional question 'beyond debate,' and courts must not define clearly established law at a high level of generality, especially in the Fourth Amendment context where results are highly fact-dependent and officers make split-second judgments in tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving circumstances. The Court found that Kisela had 'mere seconds to assess the potential danger' to Chadwick, Hughes was armed, had been described as erratic, moved toward Chadwick, and failed to drop the knife after commands, making it 'far from an obvious case' where any competent officer would have known shooting Hughes would violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court criticized the Ninth Circuit for relying on inapposite precedents (Deorle, Glenn, Harris) and noted that Blanford v. Sacramento County, a Ninth Circuit case involving a man with a sword refusing commands, was more analogous and favored Kisela.
Dissenting - Justice Sotomayor
Yes, a police officer does violate clearly established Fourth Amendment law, and is not entitled to qualified immunity, when they use deadly force against an individual who is stationary, holding a kitchen knife at her side with the blade pointed away from another person, appears 'composed and content,' has committed no crime, and may not have heard the officers' commands, because a jury could reasonably find such conduct objectively unreasonable and clearly established precedent prohibited it. Justice Sotomayor argued that, viewing the facts most favorably to Hughes, a jury could find Kisela's actions objectively unreasonable and a violation of the Fourth Amendment. She highlighted that Hughes committed no crime, posed no immediate threat (stationary, knife at side, appeared calm, 6 feet from Chadwick), did not resist arrest (likely did not hear commands), and Kisela failed to use less intrusive means, unlike the other officers present. She asserted that Tennessee v. Garner and Graham v. Connor set general principles, and Deorle v. Rutherford, a Ninth Circuit case involving shooting an agitated, unarmed man who made threats, provided specific, clearly established precedent that Kisela's conduct was unlawful. Sotomayor argued Hughes presented an even lesser danger. She also cited Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police and Harris v. Roderick as further Ninth Circuit precedents. She criticized the majority for its 'one-sided approach to qualified immunity' that acts as an 'absolute shield' for law enforcement, gutting the deterrent effect of the Fourth Amendment.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the high bar plaintiffs must overcome to defeat qualified immunity, particularly in Fourth Amendment excessive force claims. The Court's per curiam summary reversal emphasizes that general statements of law like Graham and Garner are insufficient to establish a clear violation; rather, highly specific, factually analogous precedent is required to put officers on 'fair notice' that their exact conduct is unlawful. This decision continues a trend of the Supreme Court frequently granting qualified immunity to officers, making it more challenging for plaintiffs to bring §1983 excessive force claims to trial and potentially limiting the development of constitutional law in this area.
