Kirkland v. Tamplin
2007 Fulton County D. Rep. 1394, 645 S.E.2d 653, 285 Ga. App. 241 (2007)
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Rule of Law:
A claim for tortious interference requires admissible evidence of improper conduct, not merely persuasion, and a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct that is so extreme and outrageous as to be beyond all possible bounds of decency, a standard which common threats and insults do not meet.
Facts:
- Dwain Lee Kirkland alleged that his nephew, Christopher Tamplin, made false statements to Kirkland's father (Christopher's grandfather) concerning Kirkland's involvement with Scientology, his personal life involving strippers, and a book he had written.
- Kirkland claimed these alleged statements damaged his business relationship with his father, causing the father to renege on financial commitments to him.
- After the father's death, Kirkland and his mother entered into a settlement agreement for Kirkland to receive increased payments from his father's estate.
- Kirkland alleged that Christopher and his wife, Kelley Tamplin, persuaded Kirkland's mother to breach this settlement agreement.
- During a discussion about the estate payments, Christopher allegedly told Kirkland in a "murderous tone," "What goes around comes around" and "This will all come back to you one day."
- Kirkland received two separate, unidentified phone calls, one warning him to remove papers from his car to prevent theft and another stating his psychological and criminal records had been filed with the probate court.
Procedural Posture:
- Dwain Lee Kirkland sued Christopher Tamplin and Kelley Tamplin in a Georgia trial court.
- Kirkland's complaint asserted claims for tortious interference with business relations, tortious interference with contractual relations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
- The defendants (Tamplins) filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims.
- The plaintiff (Kirkland) also filed a motion for summary judgment in his favor.
- The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment in its entirety.
- Kirkland (appellant) appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Court of Appeals of Georgia (an intermediate appellate court).
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Issue:
Do claims for tortious interference and intentional infliction of emotional distress survive summary judgment where the plaintiff's evidence of improper conduct is inadmissible hearsay and the alleged distressing behavior is not extreme and outrageous?
Opinions:
Majority - Blackburn, Presiding Judge
No. The claims for tortious interference and intentional infliction of emotional distress do not survive summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to present competent evidence of essential elements for each claim. For the tortious interference with business relations claim, the only evidence of Christopher's allegedly fraudulent comments to his grandfather was inadmissible hearsay, as it was based on Kirkland testifying about what his sister told him. Without admissible evidence of fraud, Kirkland cannot prove the essential element of 'improper action.' For the tortious interference with contractual relations claim, merely persuading Kirkland's mother to breach the contract is insufficient; there must be evidence of wrongful conduct like fraud or defamation, which was absent. Furthermore, the Tamplins had a bona fide economic interest in the estate, meaning they were not 'strangers' to the contract and acted with privilege. For the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, Christopher’s statements and the anonymous phone calls do not, as a matter of law, rise to the level of 'extreme and outrageous' conduct required for the tort. The statements are common expressions and the calls were not linked to the defendants, and none of the conduct is considered 'atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.'
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the high evidentiary bar for plaintiffs at the summary judgment stage, particularly for torts like interference and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). It underscores that inadmissible hearsay has no probative value in defeating a summary judgment motion. The ruling also clarifies the 'improper conduct' element of tortious interference, distinguishing it from mere persuasion, and solidifies the 'stranger doctrine' by holding that parties with a bona fide economic interest are privileged to interfere. For IIED, the case confirms that the 'extreme and outrageous' standard is a question of law for the court and is reserved for conduct far more severe than family disputes and common threats.
