Kingsley v. Gouldsborough Land Improvement Co.
86 Me. 279, 25 L.R.A. 502, 29 A. 1074 (1894)
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Rule of Law:
An easement by necessity will not be implied over a grantor's land if the grantee's property has access via a public navigable waterway, even if land access would be more convenient.
Facts:
- The defendants own a parcel of land known as Grindstone Neck, which is a peninsula surrounded on three sides by navigable waters (Frenchman's Bay and Winter Harbor).
- The plaintiff's land adjoins the defendants' land on the north, representing the only land border.
- Both the plaintiff's and defendants' parcels were originally owned by a single grantor, William Bingham, through whom both parties derive their titles.
- The defendants have access to their property via the public navigable waters and have erected wharves for this purpose.
- The defendants also own and operate a steamboat for transportation to and from their land.
- Claiming a right of way, the defendants entered the plaintiff's land to travel to and from their own property.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff initiated an action for trespass against the defendants in a state trial court.
- The defendants asserted as a defense that they possessed a right of way by necessity over the plaintiff's land.
- The case was presented to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court (as the Law Court) on a report based on stipulated facts to resolve the legal question of the way of necessity.
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Issue:
Does a way of necessity arise over a grantor's adjoining land when the grantee's property is accessible by navigable water on three sides?
Opinions:
Majority - Foster, J.
No. A way of necessity does not arise over a grantor's land when the grantee's property is accessible by navigable water because such access negates the strict necessity required for an implied grant of an easement. The court reasoned that implied easements by necessity are viewed with jealousy and construed strictly, arising only from 'strict necessity' and not from mere convenience. While an easement is implied when a grantor sells a parcel completely landlocked by the grantor's remaining land, that rule does not apply here. The defendants' land is not truly landlocked; it borders navigable waters, which constitute a public right of travel. Citing South Carolina precedent, the court affirmed that access to a navigable watercourse, even if inconvenient, is sufficient to prevent the creation of a way of necessity. The court concluded that while land travel might be more convenient than using the sea, this inconvenience does not meet the high legal standard of 'necessity' required to burden the plaintiff's land with an easement.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies and narrows the doctrine of easements by necessity by establishing that access to a public navigable waterway is legally sufficient access, precluding an implied easement over land. It solidifies the principle that 'necessity' must be strict and absolute, not a matter of convenience. The case sets a precedent for property law, particularly in coastal or riverfront areas, by confirming that a waterway can serve as a 'public highway,' negating claims of being landlocked. Future disputes involving properties with water access will likely be resolved against the party claiming a way of necessity over adjoining land, reinforcing the high bar for implying such grants.
