Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University
3 L. Ed. 2d 1512, 1959 U.S. LEXIS 662, 360 U.S. 684 (1959)
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Rule of Law:
Under the First Amendment, a state may not deny a license to a motion picture on the grounds that it advocates an idea that the state finds immoral or offensive, such as the idea that adultery may be proper behavior under certain circumstances.
Facts:
- Kingsley International Pictures Corp. was the distributor of a motion picture titled 'Lady Chatterley's Lover'.
- Kingsley submitted the film to the Motion Picture Division of the New York Education Department to obtain a license required for public exhibition.
- A New York statute required the denial of a license to any film deemed 'immoral,' which the law defined as one that portrays 'acts of sexual immorality... as desirable, acceptable or proper patterns of behavior.'
- The Motion Picture Division initially refused a license unless three specific scenes were deleted.
- Upon review, the Regents of the University of the State of New York upheld the denial on the broader ground that the film's entire theme was the presentation of adultery as a desirable, acceptable, and proper pattern of behavior.
- The New York Court of Appeals, in its review, explicitly stated that the film was not obscene.
Procedural Posture:
- Kingsley International Pictures Corp. was denied an exhibition license for the film 'Lady Chatterley's Lover' by the Motion Picture Division of the New York Education Department.
- The Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York upheld the denial on administrative review.
- Kingsley sought judicial review, and the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, an intermediate appellate court, annulled the Regents' determination and directed that a license be issued.
- The Board of Regents appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, the state's highest court.
- The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's order, upholding the denial of the license.
- Kingsley International Pictures Corp. appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does a state statute that prohibits the exhibition of a motion picture on the grounds that it advocates an idea—that adultery under certain circumstances may be proper behavior—violate the freedom of speech protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Stewart
Yes. The New York statute unconstitutionally abridges the freedom of speech because it prevents the exhibition of a motion picture for advocating an idea. The First Amendment's fundamental guarantee is the freedom to advocate ideas, and this protection is not limited to conventional ideas or those shared by a majority. The state cannot act as a censor to suppress films that present viewpoints contrary to its citizens' moral standards, religious precepts, or legal code, so long as the advocacy falls short of incitement to illegal action. By banning a film for its theme rather than for obscenity or incitement, New York has struck at the core of constitutionally protected liberty.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Black
Yes. Prior censorship of motion pictures is unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, just as prior censorship of newspapers and books is. The Supreme Court should not function as a 'Supreme Board of Censors,' making subjective, case-by-case judgments about the morality of films. Such a process lacks the reasonably fixed and certain standards required by the rule of law and involves the Justices in personal value judgments for which they have no special expertise.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Frankfurter
Yes. While a state may constitutionally protect itself against genuine pornography, the New York law was unconstitutionally applied to 'Lady Chatterley's Lover,' which does not fall into that category. Banning this film means that New York has forbidden any cinematic treatment of adultery that is not a sermon condemning it. The Court's opinion goes too far by striking down the statute on its face; the proper judicial role is to engage in the difficult, case-by-case task of determining whether a particular work is constitutionally protected, not to invalidate statutes in their entirety to avoid this duty.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Douglas
Yes. Censorship of movies constitutes a 'previous restraint' that is fundamentally at odds with the absolute language of the First Amendment. The American constitutional tradition, unlike systems in other countries, does not permit government officials to preview and approve or deny expression before it reaches the public. If a film violates a valid law, the exhibitor can be prosecuted after its showing, but the government has no power to act as a censor beforehand.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Clark
Yes. The statute is unconstitutional because its standard for censorship—whether a film portrays sexual immorality as 'desirable, acceptable or proper'—is not a legal standard but a 'roving commission' for the censor to impose individual, subjective beliefs. This standard focuses on what the film 'teaches' rather than what it 'depicts.' A law that banned 'pornographic' films or those depicting specific acts of sexual immorality might be constitutional, but this law's focus on the advocacy of an idea makes it impermissibly vague and an unconstitutional prior restraint.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Harlan
Yes. The statute is not unconstitutional on its face, as it can be read to require obscenity or incitement, not just the advocacy of an idea. However, the statute was unconstitutionally applied in this specific case because the film 'Lady Chatterley's Lover' is not obscene or corruptive. The Court should not shy away from its duty to conduct individualized, case-by-case adjudications in this difficult area, as striking down entire statutes only creates more confusion for the states.
Analysis:
This decision significantly strengthened First Amendment protections for motion pictures by establishing that they are a medium for communicating ideas, not just entertainment. The Court drew a critical line between the advocacy of an unpopular or 'immoral' idea, which is constitutionally protected, and unprotected speech like obscenity or incitement. This ruling forced states to abandon vague censorship standards based on 'immorality' and instead craft laws targeting specific content that met the legal definition of obscenity. It affirmed that the government cannot suppress expression simply because it finds the message disagreeable, a core principle of free speech jurisprudence.
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