Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown
1 L. Ed. 2d 1469, 1957 U.S. LEXIS 585, 354 U.S. 436 (1957)
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Rule of Law:
A state statute that authorizes a civil injunctive remedy against the sale of obscene materials does not constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint, provided it includes procedural safeguards such as a prompt judicial determination on the issue of obscenity.
Facts:
- Kingsley Books, Inc. operated a book-selling business in New York.
- The business displayed for sale a series of paper-covered booklets under the general title "Nights of Horror."
- These booklets were available on sale to the public for several weeks.
- A New York municipal legal officer initiated an action under a state statute, alleging that the "Nights of Horror" booklets were obscene.
Procedural Posture:
- The chief legal officer of a New York municipality filed a complaint against Kingsley Books, Inc. in the New York Supreme Court, the state's trial court of first instance.
- The complaint sought an injunction under § 22-a of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure to stop the sale of allegedly obscene booklets and to have them seized and destroyed.
- Kingsley Books, Inc. consented to an injunction pendente lite, which temporarily prohibited distribution of the booklets pending a final trial.
- After a trial, the judge found the booklets obscene, issued a permanent injunction against their distribution, and ordered their destruction.
- Kingsley Books, Inc., the appellant, took a direct appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, the state's highest court, solely on the grounds that the statute was unconstitutional.
- The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's judgment, upholding the statute.
- Kingsley Books, Inc. then appealed the decision of the New York Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does a New York statute that authorizes a chief municipal executive to obtain a civil injunction against the sale of obscene publications, and to seize and destroy such publications after a judicial finding of obscenity, constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Frankfurter
No. The New York statute does not violate the Constitution because it is a carefully circumscribed civil procedure, not a form of censorship. Unlike the statute struck down in Near v. Minnesota, which enjoined future publications, this law only targets specific, existing materials that have been judicially determined to be obscene in an adversary proceeding. The Court reasoned that the state has a choice of remedies to combat the distribution of obscenity, and this injunctive process is a constitutionally permissible alternative to criminal prosecution. In fact, it may be less burdensome on a bookseller than a criminal statute, as it provides a clear judicial warning before any penal consequences for contempt can be imposed, rather than the ever-present threat of arrest and prosecution.
Dissenting - Mr. Chief Justice Warren
Yes. The New York law imposes an unconstitutional prior restraint because it improperly places the book on trial, rather than the conduct of the person distributing it. The core of an obscenity determination should be the manner of use and the context in which material is disseminated, but this statute disregards that entirely, creating an abstract condemnation of the work itself. This approach, which allows for the seizure and destruction of books absent a prior judicial finding of illegal use, is a form of censorship that 'savors too much of book burning.'
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Douglas
Yes. The New York statute is unconstitutional for two primary reasons. First, the provision for a temporary injunction (injunction pendente lite) acts as a 'paralyzing power of a censor' by allowing the state to restrain publication before a full hearing is held, which is the essence of an unconstitutional prior restraint. Second, the procedure allows a single court's finding of obscenity to result in a statewide ban, which violates the First Amendment by not allowing each publication to be judged as a separate offense based on the specific circumstances and community standards of its distribution.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Brennan
Yes. The New York obscenity statute is constitutionally defective because it does not provide for a jury trial as a matter of right. The standard for obscenity involves an application of 'contemporary community standards' by the 'average person.' A jury, as a cross-section of the community, is uniquely equipped to make this determination. Depriving a defendant of a right to a jury trial on the issue of obscenity removes a critical safeguard for protecting freedom of speech and press for material that is not obscene.
Analysis:
This decision solidified the principle that obscenity is outside the protection of the First Amendment and expanded the range of tools states can use to regulate it. By approving a civil injunctive process, the Court distinguished this type of targeted, post-publication remedy from prohibited 'prior restraints' like those in Near v. Minnesota. The ruling affirmed that states are not limited to criminal prosecutions and can employ civil remedies, provided they afford due process and a prompt judicial determination. This case, decided the same day as Roth v. United States, was pivotal in shaping modern obscenity law by allowing for more efficient, in rem proceedings against obscene materials themselves.
