Kimmelman v. Morrison

Supreme Court of United States
477 U.S. 365 (1986)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

The restriction on federal habeas corpus review for Fourth Amendment claims established in Stone v. Powell does not extend to Sixth Amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, even when the attorney's primary error was the failure to file a timely motion to suppress evidence allegedly obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Facts:

Neil Morrison was accused of raping a 15-year-old girl who was his employee.
The victim reported the rape to her mother, who then contacted the police.
A few hours after the report, Detective Dolores Most accompanied the victim to Morrison's apartment building.
While Morrison was not home, another tenant in the building let Detective Most and the victim into Morrison's one-room apartment.
Without a search warrant, Detective Most seized a sheet from Morrison's bed.
Subsequent laboratory tests on the sheet revealed semen stains matching Morrison's blood type and hairs morphologically similar to both Morrison's and the victim's.
Morrison's defense theory was that the victim and her mother fabricated the rape allegation to punish him for being delinquent with the girl's wages.

Procedural Posture:

Neil Morrison was convicted of rape following a bench trial in a New Jersey state court.
During the trial, the judge refused to hear Morrison's mid-trial motion to suppress the bedsheet, ruling it was untimely under state procedural rules.
Morrison appealed to the state intermediate appellate court, raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and trial court error; the court affirmed his conviction.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey denied Morrison's petition for discretionary review.
Morrison sought state postconviction relief, which was denied.
Morrison then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey.
The District Court found his ineffective assistance claim meritorious and granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus.
The State appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, where the State was the appellant and Morrison was the appellee.
The Court of Appeals held that Stone v. Powell did not bar the Sixth Amendment claim but vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded for a redetermination of prejudice under the standard from Strickland v. Washington.
The State (petitioners) successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.

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Issue:

Does the rule from Stone v. Powell, which restricts federal habeas corpus review of Fourth Amendment claims, also bar federal habeas review of a Sixth Amendment claim for ineffective assistance of counsel where the counsel's primary error was failing to file a timely motion to suppress evidence allegedly seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment?

Opinions:

Majority - Justice Brennan

No. The rule from Stone v. Powell does not bar federal habeas review of a Sixth Amendment claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to competently litigate a Fourth Amendment claim. The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel is a fundamental personal right essential to a fair trial, distinct from the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule, which is a judicially created remedy designed to deter police misconduct. While a meritorious Fourth Amendment claim is a necessary element of this type of Sixth Amendment claim, the claims have separate identities and constitutional values. Furthermore, restricting habeas review would often deny defendants the only meaningful opportunity to vindicate their right to counsel, as attorney incompetence is frequently discovered only after trial and direct appeal. The rigorous two-prong standard from Strickland v. Washington ensures that only petitioners who can prove both gross incompetence and resulting prejudice will obtain relief, preventing every defaulted Fourth Amendment claim from succeeding in federal court.

Concurring - Justice Powell

No. Stone v. Powell does not bar consideration of respondent’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on federal habeas corpus. The right to effective assistance is a personal right tied to a fundamentally fair trial, unlike the Fourth Amendment's deterrent-based exclusionary rule. However, a more serious unaddressed question is whether the admission of reliable but illegally seized evidence can ever constitute 'prejudice' under Strickland. The purpose of the Sixth Amendment right is to ensure a just and reliable result, and excluding reliable evidence often makes a verdict less just. The harm suffered by the defendant in such a case is the loss of a windfall, not a fundamentally unfair trial, which suggests it may not meet the Strickland prejudice standard. Because this issue was not raised by the parties, the proper course is to reject the Stone v. Powell argument and leave the prejudice question for another day.

Analysis:

This case establishes a critical boundary for the restrictive habeas doctrine of Stone v. Powell, preserving a federal forum for certain constitutional claims. It distinguishes the fundamental, personal right to effective counsel under the Sixth Amendment from the judicially created, deterrent-based exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment. By doing so, the Court ensures that a defendant's primary shield against an unfair trial—competent legal representation—remains reviewable even when the lawyer's error involves a Fourth Amendment issue. The decision reinforces the high bar of the Strickland test as the gatekeeper, preventing a flood of defaulted Fourth Amendment claims from being relitigated under the guise of ineffective assistance, thereby balancing federal oversight with principles of finality.

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