Kimberly Marroquin v. City of Los Angeles
FOR PUBLICATION (2024)
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Rule of Law:
A district court does not abuse its discretion by granting a new trial limited to damages if the liability and damages issues are distinct and separable and there is no evidence the jury's confusion extended to liability. Furthermore, Rule 60(b)(2)'s requirement of reasonable diligence for newly discovered evidence is strictly enforced, with no exception for evidence deemed 'conclusive'.
Facts:
- On October 11, 2020, Kimberly Marroquin went to the Staples Center area in Los Angeles to celebrate the Lakers' NBA championship victory, where a large, chaotic crowd had gathered.
- Individuals in the crowd engaged in disruptive behavior, including lighting smoke bombs, doing doughnuts with cars, and throwing rocks and bottles at police officers.
- The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) initiated crowd management measures, including declaring unlawful assemblies near the Staples Center.
- Officer DiMaggio Rico, positioned on a skirmish line, discharged a .40-millimeter less-lethal launcher, claiming he shot a man who was raising a beer bottle to throw at an officer.
- Marroquin, who was attempting to leave the area by walking northbound, felt something impact her head, fell to the ground, and saw a blue rubber bullet nearby, subsequently telling her friend she had been shot.
- Marroquin sustained a head injury, which two doctors later diagnosed as a traumatic brain injury, causing symptoms such as migraines, confusion, difficulty focusing, and memory issues.
Procedural Posture:
- Kimberly Marroquin sued several LAPD officers, including Officer DiMaggio Rico, and the City of Los Angeles, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (First Amendment, excessive force, state-created danger, Monell, supervisory liability) and California state law (negligence, battery, Bane Act).
- Two sets of claims against Officer Rico (excessive force under § 1983 and state law claims) and the City (Monell under § 1983 and state law claims) survived summary judgment and proceeded to a three-day jury trial in the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
- The jury found in Marroquin’s favor on her excessive force and negligence claims against Officer Rico, and on her negligence claim against the City, but found both Officer Rico and the City not liable for battery.
- The jury awarded Marroquin $1.00 in damages against Officer Rico and $1,500,000.00 in damages against the City.
- Defendants renewed their motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) or, alternatively, for a new trial limited to damages under Rule 59(a), arguing the City's vicarious liability meant damages against it should not exceed those against Rico.
- Marroquin moved to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) or, alternatively, for a new trial limited to damages under Rule 59(a), arguing the jury erred in apportioning damages.
- The district court denied Defendants' Rule 50(b) motion and Marroquin's Rule 59(e) motion, finding the jury's damages awards irreconcilable, and granted a new trial limited to damages under Rule 59(a).
- Prior to the second trial, Defendants moved for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(2) based on newly discovered surveillance tapes from the Staples Center.
- The district court denied the Rule 60(b)(2) motion, finding that Defendants failed to show reasonable diligence in discovering the evidence.
- The district court then held a second two-day trial limited solely to damages.
- The jury in the second trial awarded Marroquin a total of $500,000.00 against both Defendants, and the district court entered final judgment.
- Defendants appealed the district court's order granting a new trial limited to damages and its order denying their Rule 60(b)(2) motion to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
1. Does a district court abuse its discretion by granting a new trial limited to damages under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) when the defendants contend that the liability and damages issues are so interwoven as to deprive them of their Seventh Amendment right to a fair trial? 2. Does a district court abuse its discretion by denying a motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2) based on newly discovered evidence when the moving party fails to show reasonable diligence in discovery, but argues for a 'conclusive evidence' exception to the diligence requirement?
Opinions:
Majority - Bade
No, the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting a new trial limited to damages, nor by denying the Rule 60(b)(2) motion based on a lack of reasonable diligence. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the liability issues in Marroquin's case were distinct and separable from the damages issues, thus allowing for a damages-only retrial without violating the Seventh Amendment. The court reasoned that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(1)(A) permits a partial new trial unless damages and liability are 'so interwoven' that an independent submission to the jury would cause 'confusion and uncertainty,' citing United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener and Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Refin. Co.. Here, Marroquin's claim for emotional damages stemmed directly from her physical head injury, not from the specific conduct of Officer Rico in the sense of fear of impact or future injury due to his actions. Medical professionals and Marroquin herself attributed her emotional distress (anxiety, anti-social behavior) to the traumatic brain injury. The court found no evidence that the jury's clearly mistaken apportionment of damages (nominal against Officer Rico, significant against the City) tainted their liability findings. The jury's differing liability findings (liable for excessive force/negligence but not battery) were reconcilable because battery requires an intent to harm or offend, a higher standard not present in the negligence or excessive force claims. Therefore, the jury's confusion was highly likely caused by the improper instruction on the verdict form to apportion damages, not by a misunderstanding of liability. Regarding the Rule 60(b)(2) motion, the court held that the district court properly denied relief because there is no 'conclusive evidence' exception to the explicit 'reasonable diligence' requirement. The plain language of Rule 60(b)(2) mandates that newly discovered evidence 'with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b).' The court emphasized that the drafters of the Rule prioritized judicial economy and finality by including this diligence requirement, balancing it with the goal of justice. To ignore this textual requirement would frustrate the drafters' intent. The Ninth Circuit explicitly joined the Seventh Circuit in Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Cartage Co. in rejecting such an exception. The court also clarified that the defendants' motion was substantively a Rule 60(b)(2) motion, despite references to other subsections, as its core arguments mirrored the requirements for relief based on newly discovered evidence. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion due to the conceded lack of reasonable diligence.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the boundaries of a district court's discretion in granting partial new trials under Rule 59(a), particularly in personal injury cases where emotional damages flow directly from physical harm, making liability and damages distinct. It reinforces that the Seventh Amendment is not violated by a damages-only retrial unless liability and damages are truly 'interwoven.' More broadly, the ruling sets a strict precedent for Rule 60(b)(2) motions, affirming that the 'reasonable diligence' requirement is absolute and not waived even for seemingly 'conclusive' newly discovered evidence, thereby prioritizing the finality of judgments and encouraging thorough pre-trial discovery. This strict interpretation will compel litigants to exert maximum effort in discovering evidence before trial to avoid foreclosing post-judgment relief.
