Kimberly Crocker and Julian H. Crocker v. The Hilton International Barbados, Ltd.

Majority - Torruella, Circuit Judge

No, a foreign hotel's general solicitation of business in Massachusetts, or a Massachusetts resident experiencing the psychological and consortium effects of an out-of-state injury there, does not establish specific personal jurisdiction under Massachusetts long-arm statutes for a tort claim arising from a criminal assault at the out-of-state hotel. No, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions to amend the complaint because the proposed new claims would not establish personal jurisdiction in Massachusetts. The court determined that specific personal jurisdiction under Mass.Gen.Laws ch. 223A, § 3(a) (transacting business) was lacking because the cause of action, a personal injury from an assault in Barbados, did not "arise from" the hotel's business transactions in Massachusetts. Citing binding precedent from Marino v. Hyatt Corp. and Fournier v. Best Western Treasure Island Resort, the court affirmed that mere solicitation of business in Massachusetts and the booking of a reservation there are insufficient when the actual injury occurred out-of-state and was unrelated to the in-state business activities. Regarding Mass.Gen.Laws ch. 223A, § 3(d) (tortious injury in this commonwealth), the court held that the injury referred to is the direct tortious act itself (the sexual assault), which occurred in Barbados, not the subsequent manifestations or effects (post-traumatic stress syndrome or loss of consortium) experienced by the Appellants upon their return to Massachusetts. This interpretation aligns with prior rulings where the locus of the bodily contact, not the lingering effects, dictates where the injury occurred for jurisdictional purposes. Furthermore, the court found no basis for jurisdiction under Mass.Gen.Laws ch. 223, §§ 37 and 38 (service on foreign corporations). While these sections apply to foreign corporations soliciting business in Massachusetts, the court reaffirmed that "more than 'mere solicitation'" is required, particularly when the cause of action does not arise out of the in-state activities. The hotel's activities did not substantially affect Massachusetts commerce nor did they directly cause the particular transaction (the assault) at issue. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to amend the complaint. Proposed breach of contract and warranty claims, the court reasoned, would also fail to establish personal jurisdiction. Relying on Marino, the court stated that a contract claim against a hotel for personal injury requires intentional interference with the hotel guest's right to quiet enjoyment, which was not alleged for a third-party criminal act. Moreover, the implied covenant pertaining to the safety of premises arises when a guest actually checks in and occupies a specific space, which would have occurred in Barbados, not at the time of reservation in Massachusetts. Therefore, the proposed amendments would be futile as jurisdiction would still be absent. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying discovery on personal jurisdiction, as the information sought (e.g., revenue from Massachusetts customers, employee travel to trade shows) was relevant only to mere solicitation or out-of-state services, which were already deemed insufficient for jurisdiction.