Kilmon v. State
2006 Md. LEXIS 479, 905 A.2d 306, 394 Md. 168 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
Maryland's reckless endangerment statute, CL § 3-204(a)(1), does not apply to a pregnant woman's ingestion of a controlled substance, even if it creates a substantial risk of harm to her later-born child.
Facts:
- Regina Kilmon ingested cocaine while she was pregnant.
- On June 3, 2004, Kilmon gave birth to her son, Andrew, who weighed 5.5 pounds.
- A drug screen performed on the newborn Andrew showed the presence of cocaine at more than double the minimum sensitivity level.
- In a separate case, Kelly Lynn Cruz ingested cocaine while pregnant.
- On January 13, 2005, at approximately 29 weeks pregnant, Cruz gave birth to a 3-pound, 2-ounce baby boy.
- A toxicology screen administered to Cruz's baby tested positive for cocaine, and Cruz also tested positive.
- Expert testimony indicated that prenatal cocaine use can lead to premature delivery, low birth weight, and other serious health problems for a child.
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged Regina Kilmon by criminal information with reckless endangerment in the Circuit Court for Talbot County (trial court).
- Kilmon entered a plea of guilty, was convicted, and was sentenced to four years in prison.
- Kilmon's application for leave to appeal to the Court of Special Appeals (intermediate appellate court) was granted.
- The State charged Kelly Lynn Cruz by criminal information with reckless endangerment in the Circuit Court for Talbot County (trial court).
- Cruz pled not guilty, but after a trial on an agreed statement of facts, the trial court found her guilty and sentenced her.
- Cruz filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals (intermediate appellate court).
- Before the Court of Special Appeals could hear either case, the Maryland Court of Appeals (the state's highest court) granted certiorari to decide the common legal issue.
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Issue:
Does a pregnant woman's intentional ingestion of cocaine, which creates a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to her later-born child, constitute the crime of reckless endangerment under Maryland law?
Opinions:
Majority - Wilner, J.
No. The intentional ingestion of cocaine by a pregnant woman does not constitute reckless endangerment of the later-born child under Maryland's statute. The court's holding is based on principles of statutory construction and legislative intent. The court reasoned that applying the reckless endangerment statute to a pregnant woman's conduct could lead to absurd results, potentially criminalizing a wide range of behaviors such as smoking, drinking, or poor diet during pregnancy. More importantly, the court's review of sixteen years of legislative history revealed that the Maryland General Assembly had consistently considered and rejected proposals to criminalize such conduct. Instead, the legislature deliberately chose to address the problem through a civil framework, using child welfare proceedings and providing state-funded drug treatment programs. Finally, extending homicide laws to viable fetuses in 2005, the legislature explicitly exempted the actions of a pregnant woman, which would create a legal anomaly if the less severe crime of reckless endangerment were applied to the same conduct.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the principle that, in Maryland, prenatal substance abuse is to be treated as a public health and civil child welfare issue rather than a criminal one. It bars prosecutors from using the broad language of the reckless endangerment statute to prosecute pregnant women for conduct that may harm their fetuses. The court's heavy reliance on legislative history underscores the judiciary's deference to the legislature's policy choices, especially in complex and sensitive areas. This ruling effectively requires that any future criminalization of such conduct must come from an explicit legislative act, not from judicial interpretation of existing general statutes.
