Kiana Mitchell v. Brett Hood
614 F. App'x 137 (2015)
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Rule of Law:
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a), impleader is proper only when a third-party defendant's liability is derivative of the original defendant's liability to the plaintiff. A claim that arises from the same set of facts but is independent of the outcome of the main claim cannot be brought via impleader.
Facts:
- Kiana Aaron Mitchell and Ernestine 'Teena' Anderson-Trahan competed in a run-off election for a Louisiana state judicial seat, which Anderson-Trahan won.
- The day before the election, approximately 3,000 residents received a postcard accusing Mitchell of violently attacking a pregnant woman.
- The postcard stated it was 'Paid for by B. Hood.'
- Mitchell's investigator identified 'B. Hood' as Brett Hood of Washington, D.C.
- Hood alleged he was contacted by Kelvin McClinton, a supporter of Anderson-Trahan's campaign, who asked if Anderson-Trahan could use Hood's name as a 'reference.'
- Hood denied any knowledge of, or participation in, the creation or distribution of the postcard.
Procedural Posture:
- Kiana Aaron Mitchell sued Brett Hood in federal district court (court of first instance) for defamation and abuse of right.
- Hood filed a third-party complaint under FRCP 14, impleading Judge Anderson-Trahan and Kelvin McClinton for fraud and misrepresentation.
- Anderson-Trahan, the third-party defendant, filed a special motion to dismiss Hood's claims against her under Louisiana's anti-SLAPP statute.
- The district court ordered limited discovery to identify the postcard's author before ruling on the motion.
- Anderson-Trahan sought an interlocutory appeal of the discovery order.
- The district court certified three controlling questions of law for appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
- The Fifth Circuit granted leave to appeal.
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Issue:
Does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14 permit a defendant to implead a third-party defendant when the third-party defendant's potential liability is not derivative of, or contingent upon, the original defendant's liability to the plaintiff?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No. Impleader under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14 is not permitted unless the third-party defendant's potential liability is contingent upon the outcome of the original claim. Rule 14(a)(1) allows a defendant to bring in a nonparty 'who is or may be liable to it for all or part of the claim against it.' This requires that the liability of the third party be dependent upon the outcome of the main claim, such as in cases of indemnity or contribution. Here, Hood's claims against Anderson-Trahan for fraud and misrepresentation are not contingent upon Mitchell's defamation claims against Hood. Hood's injury—being wrongfully associated with the postcard and embroiled in litigation—exists regardless of whether Mitchell proves her case against him. Because Anderson-Trahan's potential liability to Hood is not derivative of Hood's potential liability to Mitchell, the impleader was improper.
Analysis:
This case serves as a crucial clarification of the limits of impleader under FRCP 14. The court's decision emphasizes the distinction between a proper derivative liability claim (e.g., indemnity) and a separate claim that merely arises from the same transaction or occurrence. By resolving the case on this threshold procedural ground instead of the certified substantive questions about anti-SLAPP statutes, the court highlights the primacy of proper party joinder. This precedent reinforces that defendants cannot use impleader as a tool to consolidate all related grievances into a single action; the third-party claim must be one of secondary or pass-through liability.
