Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis
(1987)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A state regulation of property use does not constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment if it substantially advances a legitimate public interest and does not deny the owner an economically viable use of their property as a whole. Preventing public harm akin to a nuisance is a legitimate public interest that weighs heavily against finding a taking.
Facts:
- Pennsylvania enacted the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act (Subsidence Act) in 1966 to combat widespread environmental damage and public safety hazards caused by coal mine subsidence.
- Section 4 of the Act prohibited mining that causes subsidence damage to existing public buildings, dwellings, and cemeteries.
- To enforce this, state regulations required that 50% of the coal beneath such protected structures be left in place for surface support.
- Section 6 of the Act required mine operators to repair any subsidence damage to protected structures or compensate the surface owner for it.
- Keystone Bituminous Coal Association and several coal companies (Petitioners) owned mineral rights, and in many cases, separate "support estates" for land affected by the Act.
- These support estates were often acquired decades earlier and included waivers from the surface owners of any claims for damages resulting from mining.
- The Act required the Petitioners to leave approximately 27 million tons of their coal in the ground, which amounted to less than 2% of their total coal reserves.
Procedural Posture:
- Keystone Bituminous Coal Association and four coal corporations sued officials of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (DER) in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.
- The plaintiffs sought an injunction to stop the enforcement of the Subsidence Act, alleging it was unconstitutional.
- The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the facial challenge to the Act.
- The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the DER officials.
- At the parties' request, the District Court certified the judgment on the facial challenge for appeal.
- The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision, holding the Act constitutional.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a state statute that requires coal miners to leave a certain percentage of coal in the ground to prevent subsidence and that imposes liability for surface damage violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Contracts Clause of Article I, § 10 of the Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stevens
No. The Subsidence Act does not violate the Takings Clause or the Contracts Clause. A land use regulation effects a taking only if it fails to substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of their land. Here, unlike the statute in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, the Subsidence Act is aimed at a significant public purpose—protecting public health, safety, the environment, and the fiscal integrity of communities—rather than merely balancing private interests. The Court found that preventing activities akin to a public nuisance is a substantial state interest that justifies regulation. Furthermore, the petitioners failed to show that the Act denied them economically viable use of their property. Takings analysis focuses on the 'parcel as a whole,' not discrete segments. The 27 million tons of coal that must be left in place represent less than 2% of petitioners' total coal, and they did not demonstrate that their overall mining operations were unprofitable. The destruction of one 'strand' in the bundle of rights, such as the support estate, is not a taking when the property as a whole retains value. The Act's impairment of contractual damage waivers is also justified by the Commonwealth's overriding public interest in preventing environmental harm and protecting its citizens.
Dissenting - Chief Justice Rehnquist
Yes. The Subsidence Act effects a taking of petitioners' property without just compensation. The majority misinterprets Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, as the statute in that case also had a valid public purpose. The 'nuisance exception' to takings is narrow and does not apply to a regulation that extinguishes all beneficial use of a property interest. The Court's 'parcel as a whole' analysis is flawed because the 27 million tons of coal and the 'support estate' are distinct, identifiable property interests under Pennsylvania law. The Act completely destroys the value of these specific property interests; the right to coal is the right to mine it. By forbidding the mining of this coal and extinguishing the value of the purchased support estates, the state has effected a taking for which just compensation is required.
Analysis:
This decision significantly limited the precedent set by Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon and strengthened the state's police power to enact environmental and public safety regulations without triggering the Takings Clause. It firmly established the 'parcel as a whole' doctrine, making it difficult for property owners to succeed on a takings claim by narrowly defining the affected property interest. The case demonstrates that when a regulation is designed to prevent a public harm rather than confer a public benefit, courts are far less likely to find a compensable taking, especially if the owner retains an economically viable use of the larger property.
Unlock the full brief for Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis