Yes. If a school board was intentionally segregating one big area, it's common sense to think they might have been doing it in other areas, too. This creates a legal presumption that they did. Now, the school board has to prove that the segregation in other parts of the city was an accident and not their fault. The court also said that in Denver, Black and Hispanic students face similar discrimination, so they should be counted together as one minority group when looking at school segregation.

He agreed that the case should go back to the lower court, but for a completely different reason. He argued that the whole debate about whether segregation was 'on purpose' (de jure) or 'just happened' (de facto) is outdated. If a city's schools are very segregated, he said, that's a problem the school board needs to fix, no matter how it happened. He also worried that forcing kids onto buses for long rides just to mix schools was a bad solution that could hurt communities and education.

No. This judge thought the main opinion went too far. Just because the school board made bad decisions in one neighborhood doesn't mean you can assume the entire city's school system is segregated on purpose. He argued that the trial judge was right to look at the two neighborhoods separately and shouldn't be forced by the Supreme Court to assume the worst about the whole system.

He agreed with the main opinion, but also wanted to point out that any segregation caused by a government body like a school board is segregation 'on purpose.' Whether the board passed a racist law or just drew school boundaries in a racist way, it's still the government causing the problem, so there's no real difference between 'on purpose' and 'accidental' segregation.

Yes. Because the school district purposely segregated students in the Park Hill schools, which was a big part of the district, it is assumed that segregation in other parts of the district was also on purpose. The district now has to prove that it didn't segregate students on purpose in those other areas. The lower court was wrong to look at Park Hill separately from the rest of the district and make the parents prove segregation was on purpose in each area where they wanted changes. If segregation is proven to be on purpose in a big part of the district, that is enough to show the whole district has a segregation problem, unless the district shows that different parts of the district are separate and unrelated. The lower court should decide if the segregation in Park Hill means the whole district has a segregation problem. If not, it should let the district try to prove that it didn't segregate the main city schools on purpose.

The Court's decision mixes up the difference between segregation that happens naturally and segregation that is forced by law. It unfairly makes the school district have to prove it didn't segregate on purpose in other schools just because it did in some schools. This will cause a lot of problems for school districts across the country. The Court should stick with the rule that segregation has to be proven to be forced by law in each school and should respect what the lower courts found as facts instead of trying to reach a certain result.

The Court should stop trying to tell the difference between segregation that happens naturally and segregation forced by law, because school segregation is a big problem everywhere in the country now. If a lot of segregation exists in a school district, it should be assumed to be unconstitutional unless the school district can prove it has really tried to integrate its schools. But the solution shouldn't include making lots of kids take long bus rides to different schools, because that causes problems for kids and communities and can make education worse. Instead, schools should have to do things like change where kids go to school, let kids choose to go to schools where they'll be in the minority, and put new schools in places that will help integration. By still trying to tell the difference between natural and forced segregation and not making clear what schools have to do to fix the problem, the Court is just going to cause more confusion and lawsuits about desegregation.

The essential element of de jure segregation is "a current condition of segregation resulting from intentional state action."

… school board actions in a meaningful portion of a school system, as in this case, creates a presumption that other segregated schooling within the system is not adventitious. It establishes, in other words, a prima facie case of unlawful segregative design on the part of school authorities, and shifts to those authorities the burden of proving that other segregated schools …

The Keyes Court stressed that the differentiating factor between de jure and de facto segregation is the "purpose or intent to segregate."

For example, in Keyes, the Supreme Court held that where "school authorities have been found to have practiced purposeful segregation in part of a school system," the burden of proof shifts to the school district to demonstrate that it did not engage in such discrimination in other schools in the same system.

The Supreme Court has stated that discrimination in these areas of education constitutes a prima facie case of the existence of a dual school system.

School boards would, of course, be free to develop and initiate further plans to promote school desegregation.... Nothing in this opinion is meant to discourage school boards from exceeding minimal constitutional standards in promoting the values of an integrated school experience

—a determination of state-imposed segregation and a substantial portion of a school district could support a finding of de jure segregation throughout the district.

Instead, the Court adopted "the basic equal protection principle" it had previously advanced in its school desegregation cases

The intractable problems [of proving intent] involved in litigating this issue are obvious to any lawyer

First, doing so is fair given that DOJ has sole access to and control over evidence pertaining to when processing can practicably be completed.

Yes, proof of intentional segregation in a meaningful part of a school district creates a prima facie case of unlawful segregative design for the entire system. A finding of intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful portion of a school system creates a presumption that other segregated schooling within the system is not accidental and shifts the burden to the school authorities to prove that segregation in other schools was not the result of their intentional actions. The Court reasoned that racially inspired actions have a reciprocal effect beyond the specific schools they target and that it is fair to require the board, as the party with the relevant knowledge, to explain its actions. The Court also held that for purposes of defining segregation in Denver, Negro and Hispano students should be considered a single group due to their similar experiences of discrimination and deprivation. The case was remanded for the lower court to apply this new burden-shifting framework.

While concurring in the judgment to remand the case, this opinion argues for a different legal standard altogether. The distinction between de jure (intentional) and de facto (accidental) segregation has outlived its usefulness and should be abandoned in favor of a uniform national standard. Where substantial segregation exists in a school district, there should be a prima facie case of a constitutional violation, shifting the burden to school authorities to prove they are operating a genuinely integrated system. Justice Powell argued that the focus on 'segregative intent' is unworkable and leads to inconsistent results. He also expressed profound misgivings about extensive, court-ordered busing of students, especially young children, as a remedy, urging a balance between desegregation and the legitimate community interest in neighborhood schools.

No, the majority's creation of a legal presumption is an unjustified extension of constitutional law that improperly equates the manipulation of a few attendance zones with the state-mandated dual school systems addressed in Brown v. Board of Education. The District Court correctly analyzed the Park Hill and core city areas as separate factual matters, and it was within its purview as the finder of fact to decline to infer system-wide intent from its findings in Park Hill. The majority's decision confuses a permissible evidentiary inference with a mandatory, burden-shifting presumption, creating a vague mandate that will lead to a 'federal receivership' for school districts based on minimal proof of wrongdoing in an isolated part of the system.

While joining the majority opinion, this opinion agrees with Justice Powell that there is no constitutional difference between de jure and de facto segregation. Any action by a school board—drawing attendance lines, selecting school sites, assigning students—is state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. Therefore, when these actions result in segregation, it is a form of de jure segregation, regardless of whether it is overt or subtle.

Yes. The Denver School Board's actions in the Park Hill area created a prima facie case of intentional segregation in a meaningful portion of the school system, which shifted the burden to the Board to prove that segregated schooling in other areas of the district was not also the result of intentionally segregative actions. The District Court erred in separating the Park Hill schools from the rest of the district and requiring petitioners to prove de jure segregation for each area of the city where they sought relief. Proof of state-imposed segregation in a substantial portion of the district will suffice to support a finding of a dual system, absent a showing that the district is divided into separate, identifiable, and unrelated units. On remand, the District Court should determine whether the Board's deliberately segregative actions in Park Hill constitute the entire district a dual school system, and if not, afford the Board the opportunity to rebut petitioners' prima facie case of intentional segregation in the core city schools.

The Court's opinion blurs the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation and improperly shifts the burden to school authorities to prove a negative upon a finding of intentional segregation in one portion of the school district. The Court's ill-considered remedy will likely cause disruption to communities and school districts nationwide. The Court should adhere to the traditional de facto/de jure distinction and respect the factual determinations of the lower courts rather than strain to justify a preordained result.

The Court perpetuates the de jure/de facto distinction, which is no longer justified in light of the pervasive nature of school segregation across the country. A constitutional violation should be found whenever significant segregated schooling exists, absent proof that school authorities have pursued an affirmative policy of integrating the schools in their district. However, the remedy for such a violation should not include extensive mandatory student transportation, which imposes serious hardships on children and communities and may impair the quality of education. Instead, school authorities should be required to take affirmative steps to integrate schools through means such as redrawing attendance zones, providing voluntary majority-to-minority transfers, and strategic site selection for new schools. The Court's adherence to the de jure/de facto distinction and its failure to provide clear guidance on permissible remedies will prolong confusion and litigation over desegregation.

Keyes v. School District No. 1

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