Kevin Smalls v. Wilfredo Batista, Superintendent, Marcy Correctional Facility
191 F.3d 272, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 17910 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
A supplemental jury instruction to a deadlocked jury is unconstitutionally coercive, violating a defendant's rights to due process and a fair trial, if it instructs jurors that they have a responsibility to convince one another of their views without also including a cautionary instruction that jurors should not surrender their own conscientiously held beliefs.
Facts:
- In the pre-dawn hours of November 23, 1986, Kevin Smalls and five other men followed Lang Faulcon after he disembarked from a subway train in the Bronx.
- Smalls grabbed Faulcon, put him in a choke-hold, and said, 'we want your coat, take your coat off.'
- During the attack, Faulcon's coat, watch, glasses, and gloves were taken from him.
- Faulcon reported the incident to the Transit Police, providing a description of the events and his assailants.
- One week later, after initially being unable to identify anyone, Faulcon identified Smalls from a police photograph book upon a second viewing.
- Nearly three months after the incident, Faulcon identified Smalls in a police lineup, which led to Smalls' arrest.
Procedural Posture:
- Kevin Smalls was convicted of robbery in the second degree in a New York state trial court.
- During deliberations, the jury sent a note stating it was deadlocked 11-to-1.
- Over defense counsel's objection, the trial judge gave a supplemental instruction urging jurors to convince one another of their views. The jury subsequently returned a guilty verdict.
- Smalls appealed to the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, which unanimously affirmed the conviction.
- The New York Court of Appeals (the state's highest court) denied leave to appeal.
- Smalls filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, arguing the supplemental charge violated his constitutional rights.
- The district court granted the writ of habeas corpus, finding the charge was coercive and violated Smalls' due process rights.
- Wilfredo Batista, the Superintendent of the correctional facility (the state), appealed the district court's grant of the writ to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a supplemental jury instruction to a deadlocked jury violate a defendant's constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial when it repeatedly instructs jurors they have a responsibility to convince others of their views, without also reminding them not to surrender their own conscientiously held beliefs?
Opinions:
Majority - Meskill, J.
Yes, the supplemental jury instruction violated the defendant's constitutional rights. An instruction to a deadlocked jury becomes unconstitutionally coercive when it both obligates jurors to convince one another of their views and fails to remind them not to relinquish their own conscientiously held beliefs. The court reasoned that a necessary component of any supplemental instruction to a deadlocked jury (an 'Allen' charge) is an admonition that jurors must not surrender their honest convictions. In this case, the trial judge knew the jury was split 11-to-1. The charge repeatedly told jurors it was their 'responsibility' to 'convince the others,' which created a 'novel burden' on them. The critical flaw, however, was what the charge omitted: any cautionary language reminding the minority juror that they had the right to hold firm to their conscientiously held beliefs, even if it meant a hung jury. This omission, combined with the exhortation to convince, created a coercive environment that violated Smalls’ right to an uncoerced jury verdict, due process, and a fair trial.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces and clarifies the constitutional requirements for giving an 'Allen' charge to a deadlocked jury. It establishes that the omission of cautionary language reminding jurors not to surrender their honest beliefs is a fatal flaw, especially when coupled with instructions that frame deliberation as a contest of persuasion. The case serves as a clear warning to trial courts that the content of such charges must be carefully balanced to avoid coercion. For future cases, this ruling makes it easier to challenge supplemental instructions that lack the explicit, protective language affirming a juror's right to maintain their individual, conscientious position.
