Kevin Carmody v. Board of Trustees of the Unive
893 F.3d 397 (2018)
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Rule of Law:
To establish individual liability under § 1983 for a constitutional deprivation, a plaintiff must demonstrate the official's personal involvement in the alleged misconduct. States and their arms, such as the Board of Trustees of a state university, are immune from § 1983 suits under the Eleventh Amendment and are not considered 'persons' for the purposes of § 1983; furthermore, an inadvertent disclosure of privileged information does not waive the privilege if the disclosure was inadvertent, reasonable steps were taken to prevent it, and prompt reasonable steps were taken to rectify the error.
Facts:
- Kevin Carmody worked as an information technology manager at the University of Illinois.
- Printed copies of a professor’s privileged emails suspiciously ended up in Carmody’s home newspaper box.
- These emails allegedly exposed inconsistencies in the professor’s testimony in a separate lawsuit that Carmody was pursuing against a different professor.
- Carmody’s lawyer in the separate lawsuit filed the emails with the court, which led the university to learn about the mysterious delivery.
- The university conducted an investigation and determined it was 'more probable than not' that Carmody improperly obtained the emails himself.
- The University of Illinois fired Kevin Carmody from his job.
Procedural Posture:
- Kevin R. Carmody was fired from his job as an information technology manager at the University of Illinois.
- Carmody sued the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois and several university officials in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, alleging he was fired without pre-termination and post-termination due process of law, and in violation of an Illinois whistle-blower statute.
- The district court dismissed the entire case at the motion to dismiss stage.
- Carmody appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Carmody I), where he was the appellant and the Board of Trustees et al. were appellees.
- The Seventh Circuit (Carmody I) affirmed the dismissal of Carmody's post-termination due process claim and the state-law claim, but reversed and remanded on the pre-termination due process claim, finding it plausible.
- On remand, the district court (Carmody II) granted summary judgment for four individual defendants (Jong Shi-Pang, Ilesanmi Adesida, Michael Hogan, Elyne Cole) and the Board of Trustees.
- Carmody's pre-termination due process claim against the three remaining defendants proceeded to trial, where a jury found against him.
- Carmody appealed the district court's summary judgment rulings and pre-trial evidentiary rulings to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (this current appeal).
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Issue:
Did the district court err in granting summary judgment for individual university officials who were not personally involved in the alleged pre-termination due process violation, for the Board of Trustees based on Eleventh Amendment immunity and their status as non-'persons' under § 1983, and in its evidentiary rulings regarding an inadvertently disclosed privileged document and alleged pre-termination bias?
Opinions:
Majority - Hamilton, Circuit Judge
No, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for the individual defendants and the Board of Trustees, nor in its evidentiary rulings concerning the inadvertently disclosed document or pre-termination bias, nor in refusing to reopen claims under the mandate rule. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for individual defendants Jong Shi-Pang, Ilesanmi Adesida, Michael Hogan, and Elyne Cole because Carmody failed to show their personal involvement in the alleged pre-termination due process violation. Individual liability under § 1983 requires a causal connection between the sued official and the alleged misconduct, and mere supervisory roles or witness statements are insufficient without evidence of facilitating or condoning the violation, as respondeat superior liability does not apply under § 1983. Summary judgment for the Board of Trustees was proper because the Eleventh Amendment bars most federal court claims against a state, and the University of Illinois Board of Trustees is considered an arm of the state for immunity purposes. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police held that a state is not a 'person' who can be sued under § 1983. The court also affirmed the district court’s refusal to allow Carmody to use the 'Perry memorandum,' an attorney-client privileged document, finding its inadvertent disclosure did not waive the privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b). The disclosure was inadvertent, the university took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure (e.g., review procedures, privilege logs), and promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error (e.g., immediate 'claw-back' request at deposition, follow-up letter, motion to compel). Carmody's lawyer's tactical delay in revealing the document also weighed against finding a waiver. Finally, Carmody failed to preserve his argument regarding the exclusion of pre-termination bias evidence by not making an offer of proof, and his attempt to resurrect post-termination due process and whistle-blower claims was correctly rejected under the mandate rule and law-of-the-case doctrine, as his 'new evidence' did not meet the high bar required to revisit issues previously decided on appeal.
Analysis:
This case offers critical guidance on several aspects of civil rights litigation. It rigorously upholds the requirement of personal involvement for individual liability under § 1983, emphasizing that general supervisory authority or tangential participation is insufficient without a direct causal link to the constitutional deprivation. The decision also reinforces the strong protections afforded to attorney-client privilege, particularly under Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b), which balances the need for robust discovery with the preservation of confidential communications in cases of inadvertent disclosure. Moreover, the opinion highlights the significant hurdles litigants face under the mandate rule and law-of-the-case doctrine when attempting to re-litigate issues previously decided by a higher court, underscoring the finality of appellate rulings unless truly compelling new evidence or a change in law emerges.
