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Keungne v. U.S. Attorney General

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
2009 WL 604890, 561 F.3d 1281, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 10233 (2009)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A conviction under a criminal statute that requires a defendant to consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm to another, where that disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care, qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of federal immigration law.


Facts:

  • In November 2003, Chretien Keungne, a citizen of Cameroon, was admitted to the United States as a non-immigrant visitor.
  • In April 2004, Keungne was arrested in Georgia and charged with aggravated assault, false imprisonment, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony.
  • In August 2006, Keungne pleaded nolo contendere to two counts of criminal reckless conduct under Georgia Code § 16-5-60(b), which was a lesser included offense of the aggravated assault charge.
  • As a result of his plea, Keungne was convicted and sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently.

Procedural Posture:

  • The Department of Homeland Security served Chretien Keungne with a Notice to Appear, charging that he was removable for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude within five years of admission.
  • At a removal hearing before an Immigration Judge (IJ), the IJ found Keungne was removable because his conviction for criminal reckless conduct was a crime involving moral turpitude.
  • Keungne appealed the IJ's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
  • The BIA affirmed the IJ's finding that Keungne was removable because his conviction constituted a crime involving moral turpitude.
  • Keungne filed a petition for review of the BIA's decision with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

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Issue:

Does a conviction for criminal reckless conduct under Georgia Code § 16-5-60(b) constitute a crime involving moral turpitude, making an alien removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)?


Opinions:

Majority - Per Curiam

Yes, a conviction for criminal reckless conduct under Georgia Code § 16-5-60(b) constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude. The court determines whether a crime involves moral turpitude using a categorical approach, which analyzes the statutory definition of the offense rather than the specific facts of the defendant's conduct. The Georgia statute requires three key elements: (1) consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm to another person; (2) that this disregard is a 'gross deviation' from the standard of reasonable care; and (3) the conduct causes bodily harm or endangers another's bodily safety. The court found that the requirement of 'consciously disregarding' a known risk establishes a sufficiently culpable mental state that rises above mere negligence. This conscious disregard, combined with the 'gross deviation' from societal norms of behavior, demonstrates the 'baseness, vileness, or depravity' inherent in a crime of moral turpitude. The court also noted, citing precedent like Knapik v. Ashcroft, that the crime qualifies as one involving moral turpitude even if no actual physical injury results, because the 'good fortune in not injuring or killing someone does not change the quality of his actions.'



Analysis:

This decision solidifies the principle within the Eleventh Circuit that a crime based on a mental state of recklessness, not just intent, can be classified as a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). It provides a clear analytical framework for evaluating other state statutes penalizing reckless conduct, focusing on whether the statute requires a 'conscious disregard' of a substantial risk and a 'gross deviation' from the standard of care. The ruling expands the scope of convictions that can lead to severe immigration consequences, such as removal, by confirming that the inherent depravity of an act, rather than the resulting harm, is the key factor in the CIMT analysis for reckless crimes.

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