Keshbro, Inc. v. City of Miami
2001 WL 776555, 801 So. 2d 864 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
A temporary government-ordered closure of private property to abate a public nuisance constitutes a compensable taking under the Lucas categorical test if it deprives the owner of all economically beneficial use, unless the illegal activity is inextricably intertwined with the property's lawful operation and the closure is specifically tailored to abate the nuisance, mirroring what courts could achieve under traditional nuisance law.
Facts:
- Harish Gihwala owned and operated the Stardust Motel, a 57-unit building in Miami, since 1988.
- In October 1992, the Stardust Motel was found to be a public nuisance due to drug and prostitution activities, leading to a one-year closure order from the City of Miami Nuisance Abatement Board (NAB).
- After the motel reopened in 1993, the problems with drug and prostitution activity resurfaced.
- In December 1996, the Stardust Motel was again charged as a public nuisance, with at least eight arrests for drug and prostitution activity occurring within its premises over the preceding six months.
- Gihwala entered into a stipulation with the NAB, admitting the Stardust was a public nuisance and agreeing to a partial closure of some rooms.
- In March 1997, additional incidents of drug- and prostitution-related nuisance activity at the Stardust led to an NAB order for the closure of seven more rooms.
- In June 1997, after further evidence of nuisance activity, including three cocaine sale arrests, the NAB ordered the complete closure of the Stardust Motel for six months.
- Separately, in July 1993, an apartment complex in St. Petersburg, then owned by Residential Property Management Inc. (RPM), was closed by the St. Petersburg NAB based on at least two incidents involving the sale of cocaine within six months.
- In 1995, RPM assigned its interest in the apartment complex to Joseph H. Kablinger.
Procedural Posture:
- In the Keshbro case, Harish Gihwala filed a lawsuit against the City of Miami and its Nuisance Abatement Board (NAB) in Dade County Circuit Court, seeking declaratory relief, an injunction, and inverse condemnation.
- The Dade County Circuit Court granted Gihwala's motion for summary judgment on the inverse condemnation claim.
- The City of Miami appealed the circuit court's decision to the Florida Third District Court of Appeal.
- The Florida Third District Court of Appeal reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment, finding no compensation was required, and the Supreme Court of Florida took jurisdiction due to conflict with City of St. Petersburg v. Bowen.
- In the Kablinger case, Joseph H. Kablinger filed a complaint against the City of St. Petersburg for inverse condemnation in a trial court.
- The trial court granted Kablinger's motion for summary judgment regarding the City's liability.
- The City of St. Petersburg appealed the trial court's decision to the Florida Second District Court of Appeal.
- The Florida Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, finding it materially indistinguishable from its earlier Bowen decision, and certified conflict with City of Miami v. Keshbro, Inc., leading the Supreme Court of Florida to take jurisdiction and consolidate the cases.
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Issue:
Does a temporary government-ordered closure of a property to abate a public nuisance, pursuant to section 893.138(1), Florida Statutes, and corresponding city codes, constitute a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment, specifically under the Lucas categorical test for deprivation of all economically beneficial use?
Opinions:
Majority - Shaw, J.
Yes, a temporary government-ordered closure of property to abate a public nuisance can constitute a compensable taking under the Lucas categorical test for deprivation of all economically beneficial use, but only if the illegal activity is not inextricably intertwined with the lawful operation of the property and the closure is not specifically tailored to abate the nuisance. The court affirmed that prospectively temporary regulations, like the closure orders here, can qualify for categorical treatment under Lucas, rejecting arguments that First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles only addressed retrospectively temporary takings. To distinguish based solely on the temporary nature of a regulation would elevate form over substance and ignore economic realities, especially when property is rendered 'economically idle.' For the government to avoid compensation under Lucas's nuisance exception, it must demonstrate that the prohibited uses were never part of the owner's title or that the regulation merely duplicates what courts could achieve under traditional state nuisance law. Florida law requires nuisance injunctions to be specifically tailored to abate objectionable conduct without unnecessarily infringing upon lawful enterprises. Regarding the Stardust Motel in Keshbro, the court found that the extensive and persistent drug and prostitution activity had become 'inextricably intertwined' with the motel's operation, and the City of Miami Nuisance Abatement Board had acted patiently and reasonably in ordering the complete closure. Therefore, the closure was a properly tailored abatement, and no compensation was required. However, in Kablinger, the court found 'no similar record of persistent drug activity' or 'extensive record indicating that the drug activity had become an inseparable part of the operation' of the apartment complex. Without such a record, the St. Petersburg NAB's one-year closure was not specifically tailored to abate the nuisance, thus requiring compensation. Accordingly, the court approved the Third District's decision in Keshbro and the Second District's decision in Kablinger.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the application of the Lucas categorical takings test, establishing that even temporary government regulations can qualify as a taking if they deprive a property owner of all economically beneficial use. It prevents governmental entities from circumventing compensation requirements by simply imposing time limits on regulatory restrictions. The decision underscores the critical importance of narrow tailoring in nuisance abatement actions, requiring a strong factual record demonstrating that illegal activity is 'inextricably intertwined' with a property's overall operation before a complete closure can be justified without compensation. This ruling provides property owners with a stronger legal basis to challenge overly broad or untailored nuisance abatement orders, thereby safeguarding constitutional property rights against excessive police power. It also forces municipalities to be more deliberate and incremental in their nuisance abatement strategies to avoid takings liability.
