Kershaw v. McKown
72 So. 47, 1916 Ala. LEXIS 452, 196 Ala. 123 (1916)
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Rule of Law:
A person is justified in killing another's animal if they reasonably believe the action is necessary to protect their own property from imminent harm, and the reasonableness of that action is a question of fact for a jury. The attacking animal's owner's lack of knowledge about its vicious propensities is irrelevant to the justification.
Facts:
- McKown owned domestic animals on his property.
- Crow owned a dog.
- Crow's dog was discovered attacking McKown's domestic animals.
- Crow, the dog's owner, had no prior notice of his dog's vicious propensities.
- To protect his animals from what he perceived as imminent danger, McKown shot and killed Crow's dog.
Procedural Posture:
- Crow, the plaintiff, sued McKown, the defendant, in an Alabama trial court for killing his dog.
- The case was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, McKown.
- The plaintiff, Crow, appealed the judgment entered on the jury's verdict.
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Issue:
Is a person legally justified in killing another's animal when they reasonably believe it is necessary to protect their own property from an imminent attack?
Opinions:
Majority - Thomas, J.
Yes. A person is legally justified in killing another's animal when they reasonably believe doing so is necessary to protect their property from an imminent attack. This right stems from the fundamental right to defend one's property. The court rejected an 'iron rule of law,' holding instead that justification depends on the specific circumstances of each case, including the imminence of the danger and the value of the property at risk. The ultimate determination of whether the defendant's actions were reasonable, based on an apparent necessity honestly believed to be real, is a question of fact for the jury.
Analysis:
This decision establishes that the legal justification for killing an animal in defense of property hinges on the reasonableness of the defender's actions, not on the attacking animal's history or its owner's knowledge of its temperament. By framing the issue as a question of fact for the jury, the court created a flexible, context-sensitive standard. This precedent empowers juries to weigh the specific circumstances, such as the nature of the threat and the value of the property, making the outcome of such cases dependent on a fact-intensive inquiry into reasonable appearances rather than a rigid legal rule.
