Kerr v. Connecticut Co.
1928 Conn. LEXIS 21, 140 A. 751, 107 Conn. 304 (1928)
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Rule of Law:
A person with a known physical disability is contributorily negligent if they place themselves in a position of danger without taking extra precautions reasonable for a person with that disability. For the doctrine of supervening negligence (last clear chance) to apply, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant, after becoming aware of the plaintiff's peril and their inability to escape, had a subsequent, practical opportunity to avoid the injury through reasonable care and failed to do so.
Facts:
- William H. Kerr, a man in his late fifties with very poor hearing, was walking home at night along Asylum Avenue.
- The road had no sidewalks, and Kerr was walking on the macadam roadway approximately two feet from the trolley tracks, in a position where a passing car would strike him.
- A trolley car operated by a single motorman approached Kerr from behind at about fifteen miles per hour on a dark but clear night.
- The trolley's headlight illuminated the area about one hundred feet in front of it.
- Upon seeing Kerr within the headlight's range, the motorman recognized Kerr was in a perilous position and would be struck.
- The motorman immediately sounded the gong, applied the brakes, sanded the rails, and did everything possible to stop the car.
- Kerr, being deaf, did not react to the warnings, continued on his course, and was struck by the trolley.
- Kerr died from his injuries the next morning without regaining consciousness.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff, as administrator of William H. Kerr's estate, sued the defendant, The Connecticut Company, in a Connecticut trial court for negligence.
- The trial court rendered judgment for the defendant, finding that the decedent was contributorily negligent and the doctrine of supervening negligence was inapplicable.
- The plaintiff appealed the trial court's judgment to the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
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Issue:
Does the doctrine of supervening negligence apply to hold a defendant liable when its employee, after discovering a contributorily negligent and deaf decedent in a position of peril, immediately used all reasonable means to prevent the accident but was unable to stop in time?
Opinions:
Majority - Haines, J.
No. The doctrine of supervening negligence does not apply because the defendant's motorman did not have a subsequent opportunity to avoid the injury after realizing the decedent's peril. The court first held that the decedent, William H. Kerr, was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Knowing he was deaf, Kerr had a duty to exercise the care of a reasonably prudent deaf person, which included taking extra precautions like looking behind him while walking in a known place of danger near trolley tracks; the plaintiff failed to show he took any such precautions. The court then analyzed the doctrine of supervening negligence (last clear chance), which requires the plaintiff to prove four conditions. While the plaintiff established that Kerr was in peril and the motorman became aware of it, the plaintiff failed to establish the final two conditions: (a) that the motorman subsequently had an opportunity to avoid the collision with reasonable care, and (b) that he failed to exercise that care. The evidence showed that the motorman did everything he could to stop the car from the moment he realized Kerr was in danger. Because there was no subsequent opportunity to act differently, the doctrine does not apply, and the decedent's contributory negligence remains the proximate cause of his death.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the scope of both contributory negligence for persons with disabilities and the doctrine of last clear chance. It establishes that a physical disability modifies the standard of care, requiring the individual to take precautions that a reasonable person with that same disability would take. Crucially, the ruling narrowly defines the 'last clear chance' doctrine, emphasizing the temporal element: the defendant must have a new opportunity to prevent harm after becoming aware of the plaintiff's helpless peril. This makes it significantly harder for a contributorily negligent plaintiff to recover if the defendant acted reasonably and immediately upon discovering the danger, even if those actions were ultimately unsuccessful.
