Ker v. Illinois
7 S. Ct. 225, 119 U.S. 436, 1886 U.S. LEXIS 2007 (1886)
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Rule of Law:
The forcible abduction of a criminal defendant from a foreign country, even if in violation of an extradition treaty, does not divest a domestic court of jurisdiction to try the defendant, as long as the trial itself comports with due process.
Facts:
- Frederick M. Ker was indicted in the Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois, for larceny and embezzlement.
- After the alleged offenses, Ker was located in Lima, Peru.
- Illinois Governor Hamilton initiated a request for Ker's extradition from Peru to Cook County via the U.S. Secretary of State, leading the U.S. President to issue a warrant to Henry G. Julian to receive Ker under the U.S.-Peru extradition treaty.
- Julian traveled to Lima but, without presenting the warrant or making any demand to Peruvian authorities, forcibly arrested Ker and transported him aboard a U.S. vessel, first to Honolulu, and then to San Francisco.
- Before Ker's arrival in San Francisco, Governor Hamilton had requested Ker's surrender from the Governor of California as a fugitive from justice.
- Upon Ker's arrival in San Francisco, he was immediately taken into custody by Frank Warner, an agent of Illinois, under the California Governor’s order and transferred to Cook County, Illinois.
- Ker protested his seizure and transfer, alleging that it violated his rights under the U.S.-Peru extradition treaty.
Procedural Posture:
- Frederick M. Ker was indicted, tried, and convicted for larceny and embezzlement in the Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois.
- During the trial proceedings, Ker presented a plea in abatement, which the Criminal Court of Cook County overruled on demurrer.
- Ker's conviction from the Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois, was appealed by writ of error to the Supreme Court of Illinois, which affirmed the judgment.
- Ker subsequently sought review from the Supreme Court of the United States by writ of error to the Supreme Court of Illinois.
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Issue:
Does the forcible abduction of a defendant from a foreign country, in disregard of an extradition treaty, prevent a state court from acquiring jurisdiction to try him for a crime, thereby violating rights secured by the U.S. Constitution or treaties?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Miller
No, the forcible abduction of a defendant from a foreign country does not prevent a state court from acquiring jurisdiction to try him for a crime, even if it disregards an extradition treaty, as such actions do not violate rights secured by the U.S. Constitution or treaties to preclude trial. The Court reasoned that the 'due process of law' clause of the 14th Amendment is satisfied when a person is regularly indicted and tried according to prescribed forms; mere irregularities in how a person is brought into custody do not preclude trial. The Court distinguished Ker's case from `United States v. Rauscher`, noting that in Ker's situation, the extradition treaty was not invoked, and Julian did not act under its authority. Therefore, Ker was not 'clothed with the protection' that a proper extradition proceeding under the treaty might have offered. The Court further clarified that neither the U.S.-Peru treaty nor any other U.S. extradition treaty establishes a 'right of asylum' for fugitives in the country to which they flee, and Peru could have voluntarily expelled or surrendered Ker. While Julian's actions constituted a 'clear case of kidnapping,' the Court found no specific provision of the U.S. Constitution, laws, or treaties that would grant Ker protection against being tried in an Illinois court due to the manner of his apprehension. The Court acknowledged that remedies might exist for the unlawful abduction (e.g., Peru could seek Julian's extradition for kidnapping, or Ker could sue Julian for false imprisonment), but these collateral issues do not impact the state court's jurisdiction to try him for the underlying crime. The decision on whether forcible abduction is a reason to resist trial is a matter of common law or international law for state courts to determine, and the U.S. Supreme Court generally lacks jurisdiction to review such state court rulings.
Analysis:
This case established the 'Ker-Frisbie doctrine,' holding that the legality of a defendant's capture and presence in court does not affect a state court's jurisdiction to try them, even if the apprehension involved forcible abduction from a foreign country. This principle distinguishes between a treaty violation by a federal agent acting under the treaty (as in `Rauscher`, which involved treaty-bound federal action) and a private act of kidnapping or a state-involved abduction outside the treaty's scope. The ruling reinforces the idea that physical presence is sufficient for jurisdiction, shifting focus from the means of apprehension to the fairness of the subsequent trial. This doctrine has been influential, though later cases, particularly `United States v. Alvarez-Machain`, refined its application in cases of federal government involvement.
