Kentucky v. Stincer
482 U.S. 730 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
A criminal defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause and Due Process Clause are not violated by their exclusion from a hearing to determine the competency of a child witness, provided the hearing is limited to competency matters and the defendant has the opportunity for full and effective cross-examination of the witness at trial.
Facts:
- Sergio Stincer was indicted for first-degree sodomy with an 8-year-old girl, T.G., and a 7-year-old girl, N.G.
- After the jury was sworn, the trial court held an in-chambers hearing to determine if T.G. and N.G. were competent to testify.
- Over his objection, Stincer was excluded from this hearing, although his defense counsel was present and participated.
- During the competency hearing, the girls were asked questions to determine their ability to remember facts and distinguish between truth and lies.
- The girls were not questioned about the substantive details of the alleged crimes during this hearing.
- At trial, both girls testified in open court in Stincer's presence.
- Stincer's counsel conducted a full cross-examination of both girls at trial, asking questions similar to those from the competency hearing.
Procedural Posture:
- Sergio Stincer was tried and convicted of first-degree sodomy by a jury in the Circuit Court of Christian County, Kentucky, a state trial court.
- Stincer, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, the state's highest court.
- The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that Stincer's exclusion from the competency hearing violated his constitutional rights.
- The Commonwealth of Kentucky, as petitioner, was granted a writ of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court to review the decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does a criminal defendant's exclusion from an in-chambers hearing to determine the competency of child witnesses, where the defendant's counsel is present and the defendant can cross-examine the witnesses at trial, violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Blackmun
No. A defendant’s exclusion from a child witness competency hearing does not violate the Confrontation Clause if the defendant has an opportunity for full and effective cross-examination at trial. The Confrontation Clause is a 'functional' right designed to promote reliability in the truth-finding process, a goal that is met when the witness testifies in open court subject to unrestricted cross-examination. Because Stincer’s counsel was present at the hearing and could repeat any questions at trial, and because Stincer was present for the trial testimony and could assist his counsel in cross-examination, his opportunity to confront the witnesses was not meaningfully impaired. Similarly, the exclusion did not violate the Due Process Clause because the hearing did not involve substantive testimony, and Stincer failed to show that his presence would have contributed to the fairness of the procedure or the reliability of the competency determination.
Dissenting - Justice Marshall
Yes. A defendant's exclusion from a testimonial proceeding such as a competency hearing violates the Confrontation Clause. The Clause guarantees more than just an eventual opportunity for cross-examination; it secures the right of physical presence to confront witnesses 'face to face' during their testimony. The defendant's presence is crucial for ensuring the reliability of the competency determination, as the defendant may possess knowledge that counsel does not, which could expose inaccuracies in a witness's answers. Excluding the defendant from a crucial phase of the trial for no articulated reason also undermines the symbolic goals of the Confrontation Clause and the perception of fairness in the justice system.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies that the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses and the Fourteenth Amendment due process right to be present are not absolute for every phase of a criminal trial. The Court established a functional approach, focusing on whether the defendant's exclusion from a specific proceeding ultimately impairs their ability to mount an effective defense at trial. For the Confrontation Clause, the key is the preservation of a full and effective cross-examination. For Due Process, the inquiry is whether the defendant's presence would have substantially contributed to the fairness of the proceeding. This gives trial courts more flexibility in managing proceedings involving vulnerable witnesses, like children, without automatically triggering a constitutional violation, so long as core trial rights are protected.
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