Kenny A. Ex Rel. Winn v. Perdue
2005 WL 332417, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1891 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
Under Georgia law and the Georgia Constitution's Due Process Clause, children in deprivation and termination-of-parental-rights proceedings have a right to effective assistance of counsel. Systemic deficiencies, such as excessive attorney caseloads caused by inadequate funding, can constitute a violation of this right and may warrant prospective injunctive relief.
Facts:
- Fulton County and DeKalb County are responsible for funding legal representation for foster children in deprivation and termination-of-parental-rights (TPR) proceedings.
- Fulton County employed four child advocate attorneys to represent 1,757 foster children, resulting in an average caseload of 439 children per attorney.
- DeKalb County employed five child advocate attorneys to represent 914 foster children, resulting in an average caseload of approximately 183 children per attorney.
- National standards from the National Association of Counsel for Children (NACC) recommend that a child advocate attorney's caseload should not exceed 100 individual clients at a time.
- Child advocate attorneys in both counties testified that due to their overwhelming caseloads, they were unable to perform basic legal tasks.
- These neglected tasks included meeting with all their child clients, conducting independent investigations, reviewing essential records, and monitoring the children's safety in foster care placements.
- One Fulton County attorney, Mary Hermann, testified that meeting with a child client was purely 'aspirational'.
- A DeKalb County attorney, Dorothy Murphy, admitted that her office provided inadequate representation and that she had failed to personally meet or speak with 90 percent of her clients.
Procedural Posture:
- A class of foster children (plaintiffs) filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
- The complaint named Fulton County and DeKalb County, among others, as defendants.
- Plaintiffs alleged in their First Amended Complaint that the counties' failure to provide adequate legal representation violated the children's due process rights under the Georgia Constitution and certain statutory rights.
- Plaintiffs sought class-wide prospective injunctive and declaratory relief to reform the system.
- Defendants Fulton County and DeKalb County each filed a motion for summary judgment, asking the court to dismiss the case in their favor as a matter of law.
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Issue:
Do counties violate foster children's statutory and constitutional rights to effective legal representation by providing a system of legal representation in deprivation proceedings that is so underfunded that it results in structurally impossible caseloads for child advocate attorneys?
Opinions:
Majority - Shoob, Senior District Judge
Yes. Children have both a statutory and a constitutional right to effective counsel in all deprivation proceedings, and plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence of systemic deficiencies, including excessive caseloads, to create a genuine issue for trial as to whether this right is being violated. The court found that O.C.G.A. § 15-11-6(b) provides a statutory right to counsel, reasoning that an 'inherent conflict of interests' exists between a child and their parent or guardian in a deprivation proceeding, which triggers the statute's requirement for separate counsel for the child. Furthermore, applying the Mathews v. Eldridge test, the court held that the Due Process Clause of the Georgia Constitution also guarantees this right because: (1) children's fundamental liberty interests in safety, health, and family integrity are at stake; (2) there is a significant risk of erroneous deprivation of these interests without an attorney to investigate and advocate for the child; and (3) the government’s interest as parens patriae in protecting the child's well-being outweighs any fiscal burden. Finally, the court concluded that evidence of systemic barriers to effective representation, such as the massive caseloads, is sufficient to demonstrate the irreparable harm required for prospective injunctive relief, and that remedies like bar complaints or malpractice suits are inadequate to fix a systemic problem.
Analysis:
This decision is significant for establishing that the right to counsel for children in deprivation proceedings requires effective representation, not just the mere presence of an attorney. It affirms that systemic challenges, like chronic underfunding and overwhelming caseloads, can form the basis of a constitutional violation, opening the door for class-action lawsuits aimed at structural reform of indigent defense systems. By applying the Luckey v. Harris standard, the court lowers the bar for plaintiffs seeking prospective injunctive relief in such cases, requiring a showing of likely harm from systemic flaws rather than individualized proof of ineffective assistance in every instance. The ruling empowers federal courts to order remedies that have significant fiscal implications for local governments to protect the fundamental due process rights of children.
