Kennedy v. Tri-City Comprehensive Community Mental Health Center, Inc.
1992 WL 77977, 590 N.E.2d 140, 1992 Ind. App. LEXIS 484 (1992)
Rule of Law:
The 'Fireman's Rule' bars professionals, including police officers, from recovering damages for injuries resulting from risks inherent in and foreseeable as part of their duties when responding in their professional capacity to a situation allegedly created by another's negligence.
Facts:
- Edward Kennedy, Terrence Jostes, and John Hluska were police officers for the Town of Munster, Indiana.
- On April 10, 1988, the police officers responded to a call for assistance from personnel at Frederick House, a residential care facility operated by Tri-City Comprehensive Community Mental Health Center, Inc.
- A Tri-City employee advised the officers that a resident, Bryan Pajor, had caused a problem by throwing his medicine and spitting on the floor and walls.
- The police officers proceeded into Pajor’s bedroom, found him lying in bed, and uncovered him to ensure he had no hidden weapons.
- Pajor, who was unclothed and speaking incoherently, complied with the officers' request to put on pants and then stood up.
- As Pajor attempted to walk past the officers, Officer Jostes reached for his upper right arm, at which point Pajor turned toward Officer Hluska, and a scuffle ensued.
- In their efforts to subdue Pajor, the police officers were injured.
Procedural Posture:
- On November 4, 1988, the police officers filed a complaint in Lake County Superior Court against Tri-City and Pajor.
- Venue was later changed to Porter County.
- The police officers filed an amended complaint alleging Tri-City’s negligent, wanton, willful and/or reckless conduct resulted in their being injured by Pajor.
- On April 2, 1990, Tri-City moved for summary judgment, asserting that the 'Fireman’s Rule' barred the police officers’ claim.
- On December 7, 1990, the trial court found the rule applicable and entered summary judgment for Tri-City.
- The police officers appealed the trial court’s ruling to the Indiana Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does the 'Fireman's Rule' bar recovery for police officers injured by a resident in a residential care facility when responding to a call for assistance, where the facility is alleged to have negligently created the situation?
Opinions:
Majority - Garrard, Judge
Yes, the 'Fireman's Rule' bars recovery for police officers injured under these circumstances because their injuries resulted from a risk inherent in and foreseeable as part of their duties as public safety officers. The court affirmed the viability of the Fireman's Rule in Indiana, noting its established application to police officers. The rule dictates that professionals whose occupations inherently expose them to particular risks cannot hold another negligent for creating the situation to which they respond professionally. The court found that police officers, by the nature of their work, are exposed to risks such as physical altercations during residential disturbances, which directly applies to the facts of this case as the officers were acting in their official professional capacities. The court rejected the argument that the officers should be classified as invitees under premises liability law, maintaining their status as licensees based on their entry solely under their authority as police officers. Furthermore, the court held that Indiana’s Comparative Fault Act does not abolish the Fireman's Rule, distinguishing Indiana's approach from other jurisdictions that have rejected it. The court also found no evidence to support the application of recognized exceptions to the rule, such as willful, wanton, or intentional conduct by Tri-City, the violation of a specific statute or ordinance that imposed a duty on Tri-City to protect the officers, or Tri-City's assumption of a duty of care toward the officers. The court emphasized that strong public policy rationales support the rule, as society hires, trains, and compensates police officers to deal with dangerous, inevitable situations for the general public's benefit, distinguishing their role from that of other public employees.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the 'Fireman's Rule' in Indiana, establishing that public safety officers generally cannot recover for injuries stemming from the inherent and foreseeable risks of their professional duties. It clarifies that neither comparative fault statutes nor premises liability principles typically override this rule when applied to police responding to calls, thereby limiting avenues for recovery for on-duty injuries. The decision strongly emphasizes the public policy rationale that police officers are specifically trained and compensated to confront dangerous situations, distinguishing their legal status from that of ordinary citizens or other public employees. Future cases will likely rely on this precedent to uphold the rule unless plaintiffs can present clear evidence of willful or wanton misconduct, a specific statutory violation, or an actively assumed duty of care by the defendant.
