Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc.
1977 R.I. LEXIS 1872, 119 R.I. 70, 376 A.2d 329 (1977)
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Rule of Law:
The doctrine of assumption of the risk, when based on a plaintiff's actual, subjective knowledge and voluntary encounter of a specific hazard, remains a complete bar to recovery in negligence actions and is not subsumed by comparative negligence statutes in Rhode Island.
Facts:
- On January 25, 1970, Mrs. Kennedy (then Sylvia Forrest) attended a Providence Reds hockey game at the Rhode Island Auditorium with her fiancé, Curtis Kennedy, Jr.
- The couple sat in Section F North, Row A, which was the fourth row up from the arena floor.
- The protective shield of plexiglass in Section F North extended only high enough to protect patrons in the first three rows from flying pucks.
- During a face-off near their section, a hockey puck was lofted from the ice and struck Mrs. Kennedy over her left eye, causing injuries and medical expenses.
- Prior to this incident, Mrs. Kennedy had attended 30 to 40 hockey games at the auditorium and had seen many Boston Bruins games on television.
- Mrs. Kennedy had previously observed lofted pucks hit the plexiglass and go into the crowd during other games.
- The seats in Section F North were the only remaining tickets available for that particular game, though the couple ordinarily sat in seats more distant from the ice.
- Mrs. Kennedy and her fiancé intended to sue the hockey club for negligently failing to apprise her of the danger and afford her a safe seat, and for breach of warranty regarding a defective seat.
Procedural Posture:
- Mr. and Mrs. Kennedy (plaintiffs) brought a civil action against Providence Hockey Club, Inc. (defendant) in a Rhode Island trial court, alleging negligence and breach of warranty.
- Both parties engaged in discovery, including answering interrogatories and taking Mrs. Kennedy's deposition.
- Providence Hockey Club, Inc. filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Kennedys were barred from recovery due to assumption of the risk.
- The trial justice granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of Providence Hockey Club, Inc.
- The Kennedys appealed the trial court's judgment to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
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Issue:
Does the Rhode Island comparative negligence statute diminish the validity of assumption of the risk as a complete defense in negligence actions, or does assumption of the risk, when based on actual knowledge and voluntary encounter of a hazard, continue to entirely bar recovery?
Opinions:
Majority - Kelleher, J.
No, the doctrine of assumption of the risk is not subsumed by the comparative negligence statute and continues to operate as a complete bar to recovery in negligence actions in Rhode Island when a plaintiff has actual knowledge of a hazard and voluntarily encounters it. The court clarified that Rhode Island law distinguishes assumption of the risk from contributory negligence; assumption of the risk requires a subjective standard where the plaintiff actually 'sees, knows, understands and appreciates' the specific hazard, while contributory negligence applies an objective 'reasonable man' standard. When a plaintiff knowingly accepts a dangerous situation, they essentially absolve the defendant of the duty of care for that particular risk. This knowing acceptance, rather than mere negligence, terminates the defendant's duty to the plaintiff. The court found that Mrs. Kennedy, having attended numerous games and seen pucks fly into the crowd, had actual knowledge of the risk of being struck by a puck. Her decision to attend the game and sit in the only available seats, even though they were closer to the ice, constituted a voluntary encounter with that known risk. Therefore, she was deemed to have assumed the risk as a matter of law. Regarding the breach of warranty and products liability claims, the court found no error in the trial justice's grant of summary judgment, as a ticket to sit in a seat is neither a 'transaction in goods' nor a 'product' for such claims.
Analysis:
This case is critical for understanding the continued vitality and distinct application of the assumption of the risk doctrine in Rhode Island, even after the enactment of comparative negligence statutes. By affirming that assumption of the risk acts as a complete bar when the plaintiff has subjective knowledge and voluntarily encounters the risk, the court clearly separated it from contributory negligence, which merely reduces damages. This distinction provides a robust defense for defendants, particularly in contexts involving inherent risks of activities, as long as they can demonstrate the plaintiff's actual, subjective awareness of the danger. The ruling limits the scope of comparative negligence, emphasizing that it does not apply where a plaintiff has explicitly (or implicitly, through knowledge) consented to a risk by their free will, thereby negating the defendant's duty regarding that specific hazard.
