Kennedy v. Cannon
229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54 (1962)
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Rule of Law:
An attorney's absolute privilege for defamatory statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding does not extend to extra-judicial statements made to the press. A qualified privilege does not apply to such communications, as the press is not a proper party with a corresponding interest or duty.
Facts:
- Jane Linton Kennedy, a white woman, accused Charles L. Humphreys, a Black man, of raping her.
- Humphreys was arrested and charged with rape.
- The State's Attorney informed the Salisbury Times, a daily newspaper, that Humphreys had signed a statement admitting to intercourse with Kennedy.
- Robert Powell Cannon was retained as counsel for Humphreys.
- After conferring with his client, Cannon telephoned the managing editor of the Salisbury Times.
- Cannon told the editor that Humphreys 'emphatically denies the charge' and that Kennedy 'submitted to his advances willingly.'
- The newspaper published an article quoting Cannon's statement.
- Following the publication, Kennedy alleged she was humiliated, harassed by phone calls, and forced to move out of the state.
Procedural Posture:
- Jane Linton Kennedy filed a slander suit against Robert Powell Cannon in the trial court.
- The case was tried before a jury.
- At the close of testimony, the trial court granted Cannon's motion for a directed verdict, ruling that the statement was privileged.
- A judgment for costs was entered in favor of Cannon.
- Kennedy, the appellant, appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the state's highest court at the time.
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Issue:
Does an attorney's absolute or qualified privilege for statements made in connection with a judicial proceeding extend to an otherwise defamatory statement made to a newspaper for publication?
Opinions:
Majority - Sybert, J.
No, an attorney's privilege does not extend to extra-judicial statements made to the press. The absolute privilege afforded to attorneys for statements made during a judicial proceeding is confined to communications made within the proceeding itself, such as in pleadings or in court, and does not attach to statements made to the media. The court reasoned that while the privilege is essential for the administration of justice, its scope is not unlimited. Citing precedent, the court distinguished between statements made in a judicial proceeding (privileged) and extra-judicial publications related to litigation but made outside its purview (not privileged). The court further held that a qualified privilege did not apply. While Cannon may have had a duty to his client, communicating his client's defamatory claims to a newspaper was not a proper means, nor was the newspaper a proper party with a corresponding legal interest or duty. The court concluded that holding otherwise would sanction 'trial by press,' a practice that is subversive to the fair conduct of judicial proceedings. The attorney had other proper legal avenues to protect his client, such as requesting a change of venue or transfer for safekeeping.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the boundary between protected legal advocacy and unprotected public statements by attorneys. It establishes that the absolute privilege for communications in a judicial proceeding is strictly limited to the proceeding itself and does not create a shield for attorneys to engage in public relations battles through the press. By rejecting the applicability of both absolute and qualified privilege for statements to the media, the court reinforces the ethical prohibition against 'trial by press' with the threat of civil liability for defamation. This holding compels attorneys to use established in-court procedures to counter prejudicial publicity, rather than resorting to extra-judicial, and potentially defamatory, public statements.
