Kennedy Ex Rel. Gorton v. City of Ridgefield
439 F.3d 1055 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
A state actor violates an individual's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights when they affirmatively act with deliberate indifference to create or expose that individual to a known or obvious danger which they would not have otherwise faced. This 'state-created danger' doctrine applies even when the ultimate harm is inflicted by a private third party.
Facts:
- Kimberly Kennedy reported to Ridgefield Police Officer Noel Shields that her neighbor, thirteen-year-old Michael Burns, had molested her nine-year-old daughter.
- During the report, Kennedy informed Shields that Burns had a history of violent behavior, including lighting a cat on fire and attacking his girlfriend with a baseball bat after breaking into her house.
- Shields assured Kennedy that he would notify her before the police made any contact with the Burns family regarding the allegations.
- Over the next eighteen days, Kennedy repeatedly contacted the police to check on the investigation's status and reiterated her request for prior notification, expressing fear for her family's safety.
- On September 24, 1998, Shields, without first notifying Kennedy, went to the Burns' residence and informed Michael Burns and his mother of the molestation allegations.
- Approximately 15 minutes later, Shields went to Kennedy's home and informed her that he had just told the Burns family.
- Kennedy became upset and expressed fear for her safety, at which point Shields assured her that the police would patrol the area around their houses that night.
- Relying in part on the promise of patrols, the Kennedys decided to stay at home that night; early the next morning, Michael Burns broke into their house, shot and killed Jay Kennedy, and severely wounded Kimberly Kennedy.
Procedural Posture:
- Kimberly Kennedy filed suit against Officer Noel Shields and Ridgefield City in Clark County Superior Court, a state trial court.
- The case was removed by the defendants to the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims.
- The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on Kennedy's state law claims and to Ridgefield City on her § 1983 claim.
- The district court denied Shields's motion for summary judgment on the § 1983 claim, finding that a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether he was entitled to qualified immunity.
- Shields, as the appellant, filed an interlocutory appeal of the denial of qualified immunity to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, with Kennedy as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a police officer violate a person's clearly established Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights under the state-created danger doctrine by informing an alleged molester of accusations without first notifying the complainant, after having promised to do so and knowing of the alleged molester's violent history?
Opinions:
Majority - Browning, Circuit Judge
Yes, the officer's actions violated a clearly established constitutional right. A state actor can be liable under the 'state-created danger' doctrine when their affirmative actions, taken with deliberate indifference, place an individual in a danger they would not have otherwise faced. First, Officer Shields committed two affirmative acts: he informed the Burns family of the allegations without prior notice to Kennedy, despite his promise, and he then assured Kennedy of police patrols, creating a false sense of security. These acts together created and enhanced the specific danger that Burns would retaliate before the Kennedys could protect themselves. Second, Shields acted with deliberate indifference because Kennedy had explicitly informed him of Burns’s violent history, making the risk of a violent reaction known or obvious. By proceeding for his own convenience despite this known danger, he disregarded the obvious consequences of his actions. Finally, this right was clearly established in the Ninth Circuit by 1998 through cases like Wood v. Ostrander and L.W. v. Grubbs, which provided fair warning to any reasonable officer that creating a particularized danger through deliberately indifferent affirmative acts is unconstitutional.
Dissenting - Bybee, Circuit Judge
No, the officer's conduct did not violate a constitutional right, and even if it did, the right was not clearly established, so he is entitled to qualified immunity. The state-created danger doctrine requires the state's affirmative act to be the cause-in-fact of an injury that would not otherwise have occurred. Here, Shields did not create the danger; Burns's violent propensity was a pre-existing threat, and notifying him of the allegations was an inevitable part of the investigation. By immediately informing Kennedy after speaking with the Burns family, Shields actually mitigated the risk she most feared—being unaware that Burns knew. The fifteen-minute gap between these notifications is not of constitutional magnitude. Furthermore, Shields did not act with deliberate indifference, as he could not have foreseen that Burns’s past juvenile violence would escalate to murder. As no prior case presented remotely analogous facts, the law was not clearly established, and a reasonable officer would not have known this conduct was unlawful.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the state-created danger doctrine in the Ninth Circuit by holding that the timing and manner of an otherwise routine police action can constitute an 'affirmative act' creating liability. It establishes that a state actor's specific assurances to a victim, when relied upon, can create a constitutional duty, and a breach of that duty which enhances vulnerability can lead to a due process violation. The case lowers the threshold for what constitutes danger creation, moving beyond physical abandonment (like in Wood) to include informational and procedural failures. This precedent puts law enforcement on notice that they must consider the foreseeable consequences of their investigatory steps, particularly when they have specific knowledge of a third party's violent tendencies and have made promises to a potential victim.
