Kendrick v. Pippin
252 P.3d 1052, 2011 WL 1758826 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
The sudden emergency doctrine does not apply when a driver, anticipating adverse road conditions and modifying their driving behavior accordingly, encounters expected, albeit specific, icy conditions. Jurors may, however, apply their general professional and educational expertise to evaluate evidence admitted at trial without committing misconduct, so long as they do not introduce specific extra-record factual information or legal content.
Facts:
- On the morning of February 10, 2006, after several hours of overnight snow or drizzle, Cheryl Kendrick was stopped at a red light in the eastbound left turn lane of 37th Street in Loveland.
- Holly Pippin was driving southbound on Highway 287, in the right through lane, approaching the intersection with 37th Street.
- Pippin testified that she was aware it had been drizzling the night before, and because of this, she drove in four-wheel drive and at 40 mph (below the 45 mph speed limit).
- Pippin had driven about four miles and through seven or eight intersections without sliding, encountering roads that 'appeared wet' but were 'pretty clear' before reaching the intersection with 37th Street.
- As the traffic light at 37th Street turned from green to yellow, Pippin applied her brakes, her vehicle began to slide on what she described as a 'slick' intersection, and she realized she could not stop.
- To avoid a potential collision with cars entering from 37th Street, Pippin attempted to make an illegal right turn from her lane onto westbound 37th Street, but her vehicle continued to slide, went over the center median, struck a traffic sign, and impacted Kendrick's stopped vehicle.
- A responding police officer and Kendrick's employer testified that road conditions in the area were generally slushy and icy, and the conditions at the accident intersection were not unexpected, but rather 'pretty much the same everywhere' with no unusual ice patches or prior accidents reported.
Procedural Posture:
- Cheryl Kendrick sued Holly Pippin for negligence in trial court.
- The trial court instructed the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine and rejected Kendrick's proposed instruction on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
- The jury found that Kendrick incurred injuries but that Pippin was not negligent.
- The trial court denied Kendrick's motion for a new trial, which was based on allegations of juror misconduct.
- Kendrick appealed the trial court's decisions regarding the sudden emergency instruction, the denial of the res ipsa loquitur instruction, and the denial of the new trial motion to the Colorado Court of Appeals.
- The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court on all three grounds, holding that Pippin's testimony supported the sudden emergency instruction, that res ipsa loquitur was properly rejected, and that the alleged juror actions did not constitute misconduct.
- Kendrick petitioned the Supreme Court of Colorado, which granted certiorari.
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Issue:
1. Does the sudden emergency doctrine apply to a driver who, generally aware of adverse winter conditions and having modified her driving, encounters specific icy conditions at an intersection? 2. Did the trial court err by not instructing the jury on res ipsa loquitur when a vehicle slid on ice, made an illegal turn, went over a median, and collided with a lawfully stopped vehicle? 3. Does a jury foreperson's application of professional engineering and mathematical skills to trial evidence, including calculating speed, distance, and reaction time, constitute juror misconduct by introducing extraneous prejudicial information?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Bender
1. No, the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the doctrine of sudden emergency. The sudden emergency doctrine requires a party to be confronted with a 'sudden or unexpected occurrence not of the party's own making.' Pippin's own testimony demonstrated that she anticipated that roads would likely be slick and icy that morning, as evidenced by her choice to drive in four-wheel drive and below the speed limit. Therefore, encountering ice at the intersection was not a sudden or unexpected event, and she failed to present competent evidence to warrant the instruction, distinguishing her situation from cases involving unforeseeable brake failure or truly unexpected road hazards. 2. No, the trial court properly rejected Kendrick's proposed jury instruction on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. For res ipsa loquitur to apply, the plaintiff must establish, among other things, that 'the event is of the kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence.' The mere fact that a vehicle skids or slides on a slippery highway and collides with another vehicle does not, by itself, give rise to a presumption of negligence, as such mishaps often occur without driver fault. Kendrick failed to introduce sufficient additional circumstances beyond the skid to establish this first element. 3. No, juror misconduct did not occur when the jury foreperson made her own calculations regarding Pippin's speed, distance, and reaction time and shared them with other jurors. Jurors may use their background, including professional and educational experiences, to inform their deliberations, provided they do not introduce legal content or specific factual information learned from outside the record. The foreperson's actions were an application of her preexisting knowledge of engineering and mathematics to the evidence admitted at trial, not the introduction of new, specific extra-record facts. This aligns with the policy of promoting verdict finality and protecting jurors while allowing thoughtful deliberation. Consequently, the case is remanded for a new trial due to the erroneous sudden emergency instruction.
Dissenting - Justice Eid
1. Yes, the district court properly instructed the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine. The majority's reasoning that a 'general awareness' of possible icy conditions negates a sudden emergency when ice is actually encountered is flawed and contradicts previous precedent, specifically Young v. Clark. Pippin's testimony indicated that she had not encountered problems before the specific intersection and found that particular intersection unexpectedly slick, which should be sufficient evidence for a jury to consider a sudden emergency. A general awareness that an emergency could occur does not mean it's not an emergency when it does occur. Moreover, a sudden emergency instruction merely serves as an explanatory instruction, reminding the jury to consider the circumstances, and its erroneous inclusion should not, by itself, warrant a new trial, especially since the jury was otherwise properly instructed on reasonable care under the circumstances. I would affirm the court of appeals in all respects.
Concurring - Justice Martinez
2. Yes, an instruction on res ipsa loquitur should have been given in this case. The majority too narrowly defined the 'event.' The 'event' was not merely a vehicle sliding on an icy road, but a vehicle traveling into an icy intersection at 40 mph, sliding, taking a sudden illegal turn too fast to complete, careening over a median, and crashing into a lawfully stopped vehicle. These circumstances, viewed in the light most favorable to Kendrick, suggest an event that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence. Pippin's speed, even if below the maximum limit, was too fast for the icy conditions as demonstrated by her inability to stop. Her subsequent actions (illegal turn, crossing median) further support a presumption of negligence. Furthermore, the evidence did not suggest unusual or unforeseeable icy conditions, and no other probable causes for this specific sequence of events were presented. All elements of res ipsa loquitur were met, and the instruction, which merely creates a rebuttable presumption, should have been given as a separate ground requiring reversal and a new trial.
Analysis:
This case significantly refines the application of the sudden emergency doctrine in Colorado, particularly regarding predictable adverse weather conditions, by requiring the occurrence to be truly 'unexpected' even if generally foreseeable. It also provides crucial clarity on the boundaries of permissible juror conduct under CRE 606(b), upholding the use of jurors' professional and educational backgrounds for evaluating admitted evidence while strictly prohibiting the introduction of new, specific, extra-record facts or legal principles. The differing opinions on res ipsa loquitur underscore the complexity of proving the 'ordinarily does not occur in absence of negligence' element, especially in car accidents involving skidding, highlighting the need for specific compelling additional circumstances beyond the mere fact of a collision.
