Kemp v. United States
596 U.S. 528 (2022)
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Rule of Law:
The term “mistake” in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) encompasses a judge’s errors of law, making motions seeking relief for such errors subject to the Rule’s one-year limitations period.
Facts:
- Dexter Kemp was convicted by a federal jury of various drug and gun crimes and sentenced to 420 months in prison.
- Kemp, along with seven codefendants, appealed their convictions and sentences to the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed them in November 2013.
- Two of Kemp’s codefendants sought rehearing of the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment, which was denied in May 2014.
- Kemp filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. §2255 in April 2015.
- Kemp argued that the one-year limitations period for his §2255 motion did not begin to run until May 2014, when his codefendants’ rehearing petitions were denied, making his April 2015 motion timely.
Procedural Posture:
- Dexter Kemp was convicted by a federal jury of various drug and gun crimes.
- Kemp and seven codefendants appealed their convictions and sentences to the Eleventh Circuit, which consolidated their appeals and affirmed their convictions and sentences in November 2013.
- In April 2015, Kemp moved the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. §2255.
- The District Court dismissed Kemp’s §2255 motion as untimely in September 2016.
- In June 2018, Kemp sought to reopen his §2255 proceedings in the District Court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), invoking Rule 60(b)(6).
- The District Court rejected Kemp's timeliness argument regarding his Rule 60(b) motion and, in the alternative, held that the motion itself was untimely.
- Kemp appealed the District Court's decision to the Eleventh Circuit (Kemp as appellant), which affirmed the District Court's decision, concluding that Kemp's motion alleged judicial mistake falling under Rule 60(b)(1) and was therefore untimely under its 1-year limitations period.
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Issue:
Does the term “mistake” in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) include a judge’s errors of law?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Thomas
Yes, the term “mistake” in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) includes a judge’s errors of law. The Court concluded this based on the text, structure, and history of Rule 60(b). The ordinary and legal dictionary definitions of “mistake” at the time of the Rule's adoption in 1938 and revision in 1946 included any “misconception,” “misunderstanding,” “fault in opinion or judgment,” or errors “of law or fact,” without limitation to factual errors or errors by non-judicial actors. The Rule's drafters could have used qualifying language like “mistake of fact” or explicitly excluded judicial errors, but chose not to. Historically, the 1938 version of Rule 60(b) referred to “his”—a party’s—mistake, but the 1946 revision removed the word “his,” thereby expanding the Rule’s scope to include mistakes by any actor, including judges. The Court rejected the Government’s argument to limit “mistake” to only “obvious” legal errors, finding no textual or historical support for such a gloss and questioning its administrability. It also dismissed Kemp’s arguments that the surrounding terms in Rule 60(b)(1) (inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect) exclusively involve non-legal, non-judicial errors, noting judicial precedent showing these terms can encompass legal or judicial errors. Finally, the Court found concerns about structural overlap with other rules (60(a), 60(b)(4), 60(b)(5), 59(e)) or litigation gamesmanship to be either inherent in Rule 60(b) or mitigated by the “reasonable time” requirement.
Concurring - Justice Sotomayor
Justice Sotomayor joined the Court’s opinion, emphasizing two points. First, she clarified that the opinion does not cast doubt on the availability of Rule 60(b)(6) to reopen a judgment in extraordinary circumstances, including a change in controlling law, citing existing precedents. Second, she noted that the opinion does not establish new interpretations regarding Rule 60(c)(1)’s requirement that all Rule 60(b) motions be “made within a reasonable time.”
Dissenting - Justice Gorsuch
Justice Gorsuch would have dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. He argued that the question presented was rare and better suited for resolution through the Rules Enabling Act process, where policy interests concerning finality versus error correction could be properly weighed by a committee of judges and practitioners. He criticized the majority for adopting a broad interpretation that neither party fully advanced, particularly its reliance on the 1946 amendment deleting the word “his” as the basis for including all judicial legal errors under Rule 60(b)(1). He concluded that such policy questions should be resolved through the rulemaking process, not a “doubtful interpretive project” focused on a pronoun.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the scope of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), narrowing the potential applicability of the more lenient 'reasonable time' standard of Rule 60(b)(6) for judicial errors. By defining a judge's legal error as a 'mistake' under Rule 60(b)(1), the Court reinforces the finality of judgments by subjecting such challenges to a strict one-year deadline. Litigants are now more strongly incentivized to promptly identify and challenge judicial legal errors through direct appeals or timely Rule 59(e) motions, rather than relying on Rule 60(b) as a later recourse. The ruling also streamlines the analysis for lower courts by rejecting subjective standards like 'obvious error' for judicial mistakes.
