Kelly v. Wasserman
158 N.E. 2d 241, 185 N.Y.S.2d 538, 5 N.Y.2d 425 (1959)
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Rule of Law:
A memorandum or record of an act, transaction, occurrence, or event made in the regular course of business is admissible into evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, even if the entrant lacks personal knowledge, with such circumstances affecting its weight rather than its admissibility.
Facts:
- Alice M. Kelly, a 65-year-old woman, experienced financial difficulties maintaining her house at 813 Greenwood Avenue in Brooklyn.
- Kelly approached Paul Wasserman, a friend, seeking assistance with her financial difficulties.
- Kelly and Wasserman orally agreed that Kelly would convey her house to Wasserman, who would pay all her debts and allow her to reside rent-free in two rooms on the parlor floor of the premises.
- Kelly claimed the rent-free occupancy was for her lifetime, while Wasserman contended it was only as long as the Department of Housing and Building did not interfere.
- Kelly deeded the premises to Wasserman, who subsequently paid her debts.
- Three families, including Kelly, occupied the house, making it an unlawful multiple dwelling.
- On July 21, 1950, and October 23, 1952, Department of Welfare personnel recorded conversations with Wasserman in Kelly's welfare file, where he stated Kelly could live rent-free for life without qualifying his statement regarding Housing Department interference.
Procedural Posture:
- The Department of Housing and Buildings had difficulties with Paul Wasserman regarding the unlawful multiple dwelling status of the house, leading him to seek Kelly's eviction.
- Paul Wasserman initiated a summary proceeding in a trial court (Referee's court, a court of first instance) to evict Alice Kelly.
- Alice Kelly brought an action in the trial court to have the deed reformed to include a life tenancy clause.
- The eviction proceeding and the reformation action were consolidated for trial.
- The trial court dismissed Kelly's reformation action and ordered her eviction.
- Kelly appealed the trial court's decision, and the Appellate Division (intermediate appellate court) affirmed the judgment.
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Issue:
Does a memorandum of conversations contained within a public assistance welfare file, made in the regular course of the Department of Welfare's business and legally required, qualify for admission into evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule (Civil Practice Act § 374-a), even if the maker does not testify or lacks personal knowledge of the statements' veracity?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Judge Conway
Yes, the memorandum of conversations contained within Alice Kelly's welfare file should have been admitted into evidence under the business records exception. The court held that the exclusion of these entries was prejudicial error. First, the court clarified that contradictory statements made out of court by an adverse party are admissible for impeachment, even if that party was called as a witness by the opponent, citing Koester v. Rochester Candy Works. More significantly, the court affirmed that records maintained by the Department of Welfare, particularly those pertaining to a welfare beneficiary's shelter and required by law (Social Welfare Law §§ 80, 132), fall squarely within the scope of 'business' records under Civil Practice Act § 374-a. The court reiterated that the purpose of § 374-a is to 'overcome the objection of the hearsay rule,' as established in Matter of Coddington. It further clarified, citing Johnson v. Lutz, that the lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or the inability to cross-examine the maker does not affect the admissibility of such records but rather their weight. The court pointed out that concerns over voice recognition for a telephone conversation were irrelevant for an in-person visit record and, in any case, would only affect weight, not admissibility, under the explicit terms of the statute.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the application and scope of the business records exception to the hearsay rule in New York, particularly concerning records generated by public agencies fulfilling statutory duties. By affirming that such records are admissible even when the maker cannot testify or lacks personal knowledge, the court reinforces the exception's purpose of admitting reliable routine documentation. The decision shifts the focus from strict foundational requirements for admissibility to the trier of fact's assessment of the evidence's weight, making it easier for litigants to introduce various institutional and governmental records. This ruling is critical for understanding evidentiary standards in administrative and public records contexts.
