Kelly v. Sinclair Oil Corp.
1991 WL 207360, 1991 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 358, 476 N.W.2d 341 (1991)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Under the Iowa Dramshop Act, liability is limited to licensees or permittees who both sell and serve alcohol for on-premises consumption. Establishments that only sell alcohol for off-premises consumption, such as convenience stores, are excluded from the Act's scope.
Facts:
- On the evening of January 28, 1989, Jeffrey Dean Bryant, age 20, and his friend Scott Giannetto consumed beer and mixed drinks while driving to Des Moines.
- Giannetto and another friend, Dennis Carroll, then purchased two six-packs of beer from a Sinclair gas station and convenience store, while Bryant waited in Giannetto's pickup truck.
- The group proceeded to the Outer Limits tavern, owned by Boot Hill Enterprises, Inc., where bartender Dan Goulden denied entry to Bryant because he was underage and had no identification.
- Giannetto gave his truck keys to Bryant and told him to wait in the vehicle in the tavern's parking lot.
- After Bryant was seen driving recklessly in the parking lot, Goulden confronted him and, after a brief argument, ordered him to leave the premises.
- Shortly after leaving the parking lot, Bryant drove through a stop sign and collided with a vehicle driven by Dena Marie Den Adel, who was killed, and carrying passenger Regina Butcher, who was severely injured.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiffs Karen Kelly and David and Laverna Den Adel filed petitions in an Iowa district court against Sinclair Oil Corporation, Boot Hill Enterprises, Inc., Dan Goulden, and others.
- The petitions asserted claims under the Iowa Dramshop Act and for common law negligence.
- The defendants moved for summary judgment on all relevant counts.
- The district court granted summary judgment to Sinclair on the dramshop claim but denied it on the common law negligence claim.
- The district court granted summary judgment to Boot Hill and Goulden on both the dramshop and common law negligence claims against them.
- Plaintiffs and Sinclair both filed for an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court of Iowa from the district court's rulings on the summary judgment motions.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the Iowa Dramshop Act, which imposes liability on a licensee who 'sold and served' alcohol to an intoxicated person, apply to a convenience store that only sells alcohol for off-premises consumption?
Opinions:
Majority - McGiverin, Chief Justice
No. The Iowa Dramshop Act does not apply to a convenience store that only sells alcohol for off-premises consumption because the statute's plain language requires that the alcohol be both 'sold and served.' The legislature's 1986 amendment, which changed the statutory language from 'sell or give' to 'sold and served,' intentionally narrowed the scope of liability. The term 'served' implies providing alcohol for on-premises consumption, where an establishment has the opportunity to observe patrons. Therefore, Sinclair, which only sold packaged beer, is not liable under the Act. Furthermore, any common law negligence claims against Sinclair or dramshop claims against Boot Hill (the bar) fail on the issue of proximate cause. Giannetto's negligent entrustment of his truck and Bryant's subsequent intoxicated driving were superseding causes that broke the chain of causation from the initial alcohol sales. Finally, the bartender, Goulden, had no special relationship with Bryant or the victims that would create a legal duty to control Bryant's conduct after ordering him to leave the premises.
Concurring in part, dissenting in part - Larson, Justice
The majority correctly found that the bartender did not breach a duty, but it erred on the issues of common law liability and proximate cause. Because the Dramshop Act does not apply to Sinclair's conduct, it should not preempt a common law negligence claim against the store. To hold otherwise frustrates the rights of innocent victims and undermines the public policy of deterring the negligent furnishing of alcohol. Furthermore, the majority's conclusion that the defendants' actions were not a proximate cause of the collision as a matter of law is 'pure speculation.' Whether it was foreseeable that selling alcohol to an intoxicated person would lead to that person entrusting his vehicle to an intoxicated minor is a question of fact that should be decided by a jury, not by the court.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the scope of dramshop liability in Iowa by creating a clear distinction between establishments that 'serve' alcohol for on-premises consumption and those that only 'sell' it for off-premises consumption. By exempting convenience stores and grocery stores, the ruling places a greater burden on plaintiffs to link injuries to the specific actions of taverns and bars. The court's stringent application of proximate cause, finding intervening acts to be superseding causes as a matter of law, makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to hold alcohol vendors liable in complex, multi-party scenarios. The decision also reinforces the legal principle that business owners generally have no duty to control the conduct of individuals once they have left the premises, absent a special relationship.
