Kelley v. LaForce
2002 WL 744215, 288 F.3d 1 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
Summary judgment based on qualified immunity is improper when there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the information an official possessed at the time of their actions, as the objective reasonableness of the official's conduct cannot be determined as a matter of law.
Facts:
- On January 20, 1996, Michael Kelley entered into a purchase and sale agreement and a management agreement with Joseph LaForce for a restaurant and bar called Jessica's Pub.
- The management agreement gave Kelley full responsibility for managing the Pub and explicitly prohibited LaForce from removing Kelley or resuming possession of the business.
- Kelley paid LaForce over $38,000, began operating the Pub, hired employees, purchased stock, and entered into a lease for the real estate, though the liquor license remained in LaForce's name.
- On October 29, 1996, while Kelley was incarcerated on an unrelated charge, LaForce's agent, Robert Fontaine, attempted to take possession of the Pub from Kelley's employee, Al Mascroft.
- When Mascroft refused to surrender control, Fontaine sought assistance from the Town of North Brookfield's police department.
- Police Chief David Darrin telephoned LaForce, who was in Florida, to verify his ownership.
- Chief Darrin, Deputy Chief Peter Fullam, and Officer Douglas Blood then went to the Pub and, after Mascroft asked for a court order, threatened to arrest him if he did not leave.
- Faced with the threat of arrest, Mascroft left the premises, and the Kelleys were subsequently barred from entry.
Procedural Posture:
- Michael and Lenore Kelley filed a civil rights and state tort suit in state court against the Town of North Brookfield, its police officers and officials, and others.
- The state court issued a preliminary injunction preventing the seller and his agents from interfering with Kelley’s possession of the Pub.
- The case was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
- The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims, finding the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and the Town was not liable.
- The Kelleys (plaintiffs-appellants) appealed the grant of summary judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether police officers knew of an individual's property interest in a business preclude granting summary judgment in favor of the officers on the basis of qualified immunity for their actions in evicting that individual's agent from the premises?
Opinions:
Majority - Torruella, Circuit Judge
Yes, a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the officers' knowledge precludes summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability unless their actions violate a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known. The reasonableness of the officers' conduct turns on what they knew at the time. The Kelleys presented evidence suggesting the police were aware of Kelley's ownership interest, including police reports referring to Kelley as the owner and a deputy chief's deposition testimony. Because the defendants claim they reasonably believed they were merely evicting a terminated employee at the owner's request, there is a material factual dispute as to the officers' knowledge. This dispute must be resolved by a trier of fact before a court can determine if the officers' actions were objectively reasonable, making summary judgment inappropriate.
Analysis:
This case underscores that qualified immunity is not an absolute shield that allows officials to escape trial when key facts are in dispute. It clarifies that the 'objective reasonableness' inquiry is highly fact-specific and cannot be resolved on summary judgment if there is conflicting evidence about what an official knew. The decision strengthens the position of civil rights plaintiffs by ensuring that if they can produce credible evidence contradicting an official's account, the question of reasonableness must be decided by a jury, not a judge, thus preventing premature dismissal of the case.
