No. A state lawyer group can't force its members to pay for political causes that aren't related to the practice of law. The State Bar claimed it was part of the government, so it could say whatever it wanted. The Supreme Court said that's not right. The Bar is more like a labor union that people are forced to pay. Just like a union can't use a worker's fees to donate to a political candidate the worker hates, the State Bar can't use a lawyer's fees to lobby for things like gun control. The Bar can only use the money for things directly connected to its job, like writing ethics rules for lawyers or disciplining lawyers who break the rules.

I agree that the state can make lawyers join the bar association and pay fees, but I disagree about how those fees can be used. The bar association can use the fees for things that are related to making sure lawyers are doing a good job and improving legal services. But it can't use the fees to support political causes that aren't related to those goals. The main question is whether the way the fees are being spent is necessary or reasonable for regulating lawyers or improving legal services in the state. It won't always be easy to tell the difference between acceptable and unacceptable ways for the bar to spend money. But some things are clearly not okay, like using fees to support gun control laws. And some things are clearly fine, like using fees to discipline lawyers who break rules or make ethics rules.

—a state's interest in "regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services,"

—again recognizing the "substantial analogy" between an integrated bar association (one in which membership and dues are required as a condition of practicing law) and a union, held that activities germane to the goals of a bar association could be funded with mandatory dues.

—holding that the use of compulsory bar dues to finance political activities violated the First Amendment

`If every citizen were to have a right to insist that no one paid by public funds express a view with which he disagreed, debate over issues of great concern to the public would be limited to those in the private sector, and the process of government as we know it radically transformed

There, the Supreme Court held that the California Bar's use of compulsory dues to finance political and ideological activities with which members disagreed violated their First Amendment right to free speech when such expenditures were not for the purpose of regulating the legal profession or improving the quality of services.

The Bar may "constitutionally fund activities germane to [regulating the legal profession or improving the quality of legal services] out of the mandatory dues of all members. It may not, however, in such manner fund activities of an ideological nature which fall outside of those areas of activity."

For the last 25 years unions and employers across the Nation have relied upon this Court's statements in Hudson in developing administratively workable systems that (1) allow unions to pay the costs of fulfilling their representational obligations to both members and nonmembers alike, while (2) simultaneously protecting the nonmembers' constitutional right not to …

The First Amendment consequences of the State's action have not been addressed in this case, but the potential for a serious violation is there.

The Supreme Court noted that the State Bar was created "not to participate in the general government of the State, but to provide specialized professional advice to those with the ultimate responsibility of governing the legal profession."

Yes. The First Amendment prohibits an integrated state bar from using compulsory dues to fund activities of a political or ideological nature that are not germane to its purposes of regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services. The Court rejected the argument that the State Bar is a government agency whose speech is unrestricted by the First Amendment. Instead, the Court found a substantial analogy between the integrated bar and a union agency shop, applying the principles from *Abood v. Detroit Board of Education*. Just as a union cannot use dissenting non-members' fees for political purposes unrelated to collective bargaining, the State Bar cannot use members' dues for ideological activities unrelated to its core regulatory functions. The appropriate standard is whether the challenged expenditures are necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of regulating the legal profession or improving the quality of legal services. While activities like proposing ethical codes and disciplining members are permissible, using dues to endorse a gun control or nuclear weapons freeze initiative is not.

I agree that lawyers admitted to practice in the State may be required to join and pay dues to the State Bar, but disagree as to the scope of permissible dues-financed activities in which the State Bar may engage. The State Bar may constitutionally fund activities germane to regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services out of the mandatory dues of all members. It may not, however, in such manner fund activities of an ideological nature which fall outside of those areas of activity. The guiding standard must be whether the challenged expenditures are necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of regulating the legal profession or improving the quality of the legal service available to the people of the State. Precisely where the line falls between those State Bar activities in which the officials and members of the Bar are acting essentially as professional advisers to those ultimately charged with the regulation of the legal profession, on the one hand, and those activities having political or ideological coloration which are not reasonably related to the advancement of such goals, on the other, will not always be easy to discern. But the extreme ends of the spectrum are clear: Compulsory dues may not be expended to endorse or advance a gun control or nuclear weapons freeze initiative; at the other end of the spectrum petitioners have no valid constitutional objection to their compulsory dues being spent for activities connected with disciplining members of the Bar or proposing ethical codes for the profession.

Keller v. State Bar of California

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