Keesecker v. Bird
490 S.E.2d 754, 1997 W. Va. LEXIS 302, 200 W. Va. 667 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
A summary judgment order must contain sufficient factual findings and legal analysis for meaningful appellate review; the “real party in interest” rule applies only to parties asserting claims, not to defendants; and a claim for waste is subject to a two-year statute of limitations, which the discovery rule will not toll if the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the injury, duty, breach, and causation.
Facts:
- In late 1974, Ward W. Keesecker, Sr. (Dr. Keesecker) and his second wife, Emily M. Keesecker, were involved in an automobile accident.
- Dr. Keesecker died from his injuries on January 24, 1975, leaving certain real and personal property (Highwood House and its contents) to Emily Keesecker for her life, with the remainder interest going to his son, Ward W. Keesecker, II.
- On May 1, 1981, the Circuit Court of Arlington County, Virginia, appointed Arch Steiner as “Committee of the estate of Emily M. Keesecker” to manage her affairs.
- In 1986, Mr. Steiner moved to Tennessee, and on June 26, 1986, Walter Bird was appointed committee for Emily Keesecker by the same Virginia court, receiving an inventory of Highwood House's contents from Steiner.
- During Mr. Bird’s tenure, Highwood House was burglarized numerous times, homeowner's insurance was canceled in January 1990, and Mr. Bird subsequently declined to purchase new coverage.
- In November 1990, the Virginia Commissioner of Accounts wrote to Mr. Bird, advising him to consider selling or abandoning Highwood House due to insufficient funds for utilities, maintenance, or repairs.
- On December 26, 1991, Highwood House was severely damaged in a fire of suspicious origin, and a second fire on January 27, 1993, virtually destroyed it.
- Ward W. Keesecker, II knew of the property's deterioration as far back as 1975 and throughout Mr. Steiner’s tenure, and was aware by 1986 that Mr. Bird had taken over management.
Procedural Posture:
- Walter Bird initiated a lawsuit against Ward Keesecker, II in circuit court to compel the sale of Highwood House.
- Ward Keesecker, II answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim against Walter Bird and a third-party complaint against Arch Steiner, alleging they committed waste to the property.
- Mr. Bird and Mr. Steiner filed motions for summary judgment, arguing they were not proper parties to the action and, for Steiner, that claims against him were barred by the statute of limitations.
- On August 18, 1995, the circuit court granted summary judgment for Mr. Bird, ruling he was “not a proper party to the instant litigation.”
- On the same date, the circuit court granted summary judgment for Mr. Steiner, ruling that the claims against him were barred by the statute of limitations.
- Ward W. Keesecker, II appealed these two summary judgment orders to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
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Issue:
1. Did the circuit court err by granting summary judgment to Walter Bird based on an inadequate order and an incorrect application of the “real party in interest” rule under W.Va.R.Civ.P. Rule 17(a)? 2. Did the circuit court err by granting summary judgment to Arch Steiner, finding the plaintiff's claim for waste barred by the statute of limitations, despite the plaintiff's assertion of the discovery rule?
Opinions:
Majority - Starcher, Justice
Yes, the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to Walter Bird. The circuit court’s order was inadequate because it lacked specific factual findings and legal analysis required for meaningful appellate review, failing to meet the standards set forth in Fayette County National Bank. Furthermore, the court incorrectly applied W.Va.R.Civ.P. Rule 17(a), the “real party in interest” rule, to a defendant. Rule 17(a) is intended to ensure that a claimant possesses the substantive right sought to be enforced and applies only to parties prosecuting claims (plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants), not to those defending against them. On remand, the court must determine Mr. Bird’s duties towards Emily Keesecker’s estate under Virginia law (where his committeeship was established) and, if a duty to manage property in West Virginia is found, the method of caring for that property is to be guided by West Virginia law, applying the doctrine of lex loci rei sitae. No, the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment to Arch Steiner. The appellant’s claim for permissive waste, which is an injury to property, is subject to a two-year statute of limitations under W.Va.Code, 55-2-12 [1959]. The cause of action against Mr. Steiner accrued in 1986 when he relinquished his committeeship. The appellant is not entitled to the benefit of the discovery rule as he knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known by 1986 all the essential elements of his claim: that he was injured (property deterioration), the identity of the entity (Steiner) who owed a duty and may have breached it, and the causal relation between Steiner's conduct and the injury. There was also no evidence that Steiner engaged in misconduct to prevent the appellant from discovering the wrong. Therefore, the appellant’s claims against Steiner are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
Analysis:
This case clarifies crucial procedural and substantive legal principles. It emphasizes that summary judgment orders must contain detailed factual findings and legal reasoning to permit effective appellate review, preventing boilerplate dismissals. The ruling also narrows the application of the “real party in interest” rule, confirming it applies exclusively to claimants asserting a cause of action, not to defendants. Substantively, the opinion provides guidance on complex choice of law questions involving fiduciaries appointed in one state managing real and personal property located in another, applying lex loci rei sitae for property management duties. Finally, it reinforces the strict application of the statute of limitations for property damage claims, particularly regarding the discovery rule, holding plaintiffs accountable for exercising reasonable diligence in discovering claims when the essential elements are known or knowable.
