Keep Chicago Livable v. City of Chicago
913 F.3d 618 (2019)
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Rule of Law:
To establish Article III standing in federal court, a plaintiff must demonstrate a concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent injury-in-fact at all stages of the litigation. If a plaintiff's circumstances change such that the injury ceases to exist, the claim becomes moot and the court loses subject matter jurisdiction.
Facts:
- In June 2016, the City of Chicago enacted the Shared Housing Ordinance to regulate short-term home rentals, such as those offered through Airbnb.
- The Ordinance requires hosts to register, obtain a license, and comply with various regulations including geographic restrictions, unit limits within buildings, and health and safety standards.
- Benjamin Wolf, an initial plaintiff, used Airbnb to rent out his home in Chicago and intended to continue doing so.
- After the lawsuit was filed, Benjamin Wolf sold his property in Chicago and moved to Ohio.
- Plaintiff Susan Maller ceased her Airbnb operations, vaguely citing restrictions of the Ordinance and "harassment of her building's property manager."
- Plaintiff Danielle McCarron moved out of an apartment that was on the City's Prohibited Buildings List and stopped attempting to participate in home-sharing.
- Plaintiffs Monica Wolf and John Doe, who were visitors to Chicago, alleged the Ordinance limited their rental options but have not returned to the city since the law was enacted.
- Keep Chicago Livable is a non-profit organization whose stated purpose is to educate home-sharing hosts about compliance with local laws.
Procedural Posture:
- Keep Chicago Livable and six individuals sued the City of Chicago in the U.S. District Court, challenging the constitutionality of the city's Shared Housing Ordinance.
- The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction on their free speech and vagueness claims.
- The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.
- The district court then dismissed the plaintiffs' remaining claims without prejudice, to be revisited after the appeal on the injunction denial was resolved.
- The plaintiffs (appellants) appealed both the denial of the preliminary injunction and the dismissal of their other claims to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Issue:
Do the plaintiffs, an organization and several individuals, have Article III standing to challenge Chicago's Shared Housing Ordinance when their alleged injuries have either become moot due to changed circumstances or are pleaded in general, non-particularized terms?
Opinions:
Majority - Scudder, Circuit Judge.
No, on the current record, the plaintiffs have not demonstrated the necessary injury to establish Article III standing. To invoke federal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show an injury-in-fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent, and this standing must persist throughout all stages of litigation. Benjamin Wolf's claim is moot because he sold his Chicago property and is no longer affected by the Ordinance. The other individual plaintiffs (Maller, McCarron, and Wonsey) failed to allege with sufficient particularity how the Ordinance, as opposed to other factors, caused them injury. The out-of-town plaintiffs (Monica Wolf and John Doe) did not demonstrate an actual or imminent plan to return to Chicago and how the Ordinance concretely harms them. The organization, Keep Chicago Livable, lacks both organizational standing—as its claimed injury of finding its educational mission more difficult is too abstract and not a direct harm like in Havens Realty—and associational standing, as it cannot satisfy the first prong of the Hunt test because it failed to identify any member with standing to sue in their own right.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms the stringent requirements of Article III standing as a threshold jurisdictional matter that must be satisfied at all stages of litigation. It illustrates that federal courts will not decide the merits of a constitutional challenge, regardless of its importance, without a plaintiff who has a demonstrable, ongoing, and personal stake in the outcome. The ruling emphasizes that changed circumstances can render a case moot and that vague or generalized allegations of harm are insufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction. For organizations, it clarifies that an abstract setback to their mission is not a concrete injury and that associational standing is entirely dependent on the standing of its individual members.
