Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes
504 U.S. 1 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
A federal habeas petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a claim where the facts were not adequately developed in state court unless the petitioner can show cause for the failure to develop the facts and actual prejudice resulting from that failure. A hearing may also be mandated to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice.
Facts:
- Jose Tamayo-Reyes, a Cuban immigrant with limited education and knowledge of English, was involved in a confrontation with his girlfriend in a bar in 1984.
- Another man allegedly attempted to intervene in the confrontation.
- Tamayo-Reyes was charged with murder for the stabbing death of the man who had intervened.
- He was provided with a defense attorney and an interpreter for his court proceedings.
- His attorney recommended that he plead nolo contendere (no contest) to a lesser charge of first-degree manslaughter.
- Tamayo-Reyes signed a plea form, written in English, which explained the rights he was waiving by entering the plea.
- At the plea hearing, with his interpreter present, Tamayo-Reyes affirmed to the judge that he understood his rights and wished to enter the plea.
- Tamayo-Reyes later claimed that his interpreter had not accurately translated the mental state (mens rea) element of manslaughter and that he believed he was agreeing to be tried for manslaughter, not pleading guilty to it.
Procedural Posture:
- Jose Tamayo-Reyes pled nolo contendere to first-degree manslaughter in an Oregon state trial court.
- Tamayo-Reyes filed a petition for postconviction relief in state court, alleging his plea was not knowing and intelligent.
- After a hearing, the state trial court dismissed the petition.
- The Oregon Court of Appeals (an intermediate appellate court) affirmed the dismissal.
- The Oregon Supreme Court (the state's highest court) denied review.
- Tamayo-Reyes then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, seeking a federal evidentiary hearing.
- The District Court denied the petition without a hearing, finding Tamayo-Reyes's failure to develop facts was due to 'inexcusable neglect.'
- Tamayo-Reyes appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Ninth Circuit, applying the 'deliberate bypass' standard from Townsend v. Sain, reversed the District Court and held that Tamayo-Reyes was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
- The State of Oregon, represented by Keeney (the petitioner), successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does the 'cause and prejudice' standard, rather than the 'deliberate bypass' standard, apply to a federal habeas petitioner's failure to develop a material fact in state court proceedings?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice White
Yes, the 'cause and prejudice' standard applies to a federal habeas petitioner's failure to develop a material fact in state court proceedings. The Court overrules the part of Townsend v. Sain that applied the more lenient 'deliberate bypass' standard from the now-repudiated Fay v. Noia. Applying the stricter 'cause and prejudice' standard promotes uniformity in habeas law, as it is the same standard used for procedural defaults. This standard properly accommodates concerns of finality, comity, and judicial economy by encouraging full factual development in state court, which is the most appropriate forum. A petitioner must now show an objective external factor prevented them from developing the facts and that this failure caused actual and substantial prejudice; otherwise, a hearing is only available if needed to prevent a 'fundamental miscarriage of justice.'
Dissenting - Justice O'Connor
No, the 'cause and prejudice' standard should not replace the 'deliberate bypass' standard in this context. The majority improperly transposes a standard designed to determine whether a federal court will consider a claim (procedural default) to the different question of how a court, having already decided to hear the claim, should go about resolving it (evidentiary hearing). This decision departs from a long history of habeas law, predating Townsend, that guaranteed a hearing when state fact-finding was unreliable. Furthermore, the decision effectively renders a portion of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and Townsend's fifth circumstance a dead letter, as attorney error in post-conviction proceedings (a common reason for undeveloped facts) does not constitute 'cause' under the new standard.
Dissenting - Justice Kennedy
No, the 'cause and prejudice' standard should not apply. While our recent decisions have properly curbed the abuse of the writ, this decision goes too far by diminishing the likelihood that federal courts will base their decisions on an accurate assessment of the facts. The cases affected by this ruling are few but are precisely those where there is a realistic possibility that an evidentiary hearing could prevent a constitutional error. The Court should not take steps that undermine the federal courts' ability to accurately resolve properly presented constitutional claims.
Analysis:
This decision significantly restricts access to federal evidentiary hearings for habeas petitioners, continuing the Rehnquist Court's trend of narrowing federal habeas corpus relief. By replacing the lenient 'deliberate bypass' standard with the stringent 'cause and prejudice' test for failures to develop facts, the Court prioritizes finality and comity over providing a federal forum to correct potential state court errors. This ruling makes it much more difficult for petitioners to overcome evidentiary shortcomings in state proceedings, particularly those resulting from their counsel's negligence, thereby strengthening the finality of state court convictions.
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