Keenan v. Superior Court
40 P.3d 718, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 27 Cal. 4th 413 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
A statute that confiscates all proceeds a convicted felon earns from expressive materials that include a substantial account of their felony is an unconstitutional content-based regulation of speech because it is not narrowly tailored to the state's compelling interest in compensating crime victims.
Facts:
- In 1963, Barry Keenan, Joseph Amsler, and John Irwin kidnapped Frank Sinatra, Jr. from his hotel room.
- Sinatra, Jr. was held until his father paid a ransom.
- Keenan, Amsler, and Irwin were subsequently apprehended, tried, and convicted of felony offenses.
- In 1998, Keenan participated in an interview that resulted in a magazine article titled 'Snatching Sinatra,' which detailed the kidnapping.
- Columbia Pictures subsequently purchased the motion picture rights to the story for up to $1.5 million.
- The arrangement provided that Keenan and his accomplices would receive a portion of the proceeds from the sale of the motion picture rights.
Procedural Posture:
- Frank Sinatra, Jr. filed a complaint against Barry Keenan and others in Los Angeles Superior Court (trial court), seeking to impose an involuntary trust on proceeds from the story of his kidnapping under Civil Code section 2225.
- The trial court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting Columbia Pictures from paying any monies to Keenan.
- Keenan filed a demurrer to the complaint, arguing that section 2225 was facially unconstitutional.
- The trial court overruled Keenan's demurrer and denied his motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction.
- Keenan filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal.
- The Court of Appeal denied the writ, holding that the statute was constitutional.
- The Supreme Court of California granted review.
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Issue:
Does California Civil Code section 2225, which imposes an involuntary trust on all proceeds a convicted felon receives from expressive materials that include the story of the felony, facially violate the free speech clauses of the First Amendment and the California Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Baxter, J.
Yes. California’s 'Son of Sam' law facially violates the free speech clauses of the U.S. and California Constitutions because it is an overinclusive, content-based financial penalty on protected speech. The statute is subject to strict scrutiny because it imposes a financial disincentive on speech of a particular content—a felon's story of their crime. While the state has a compelling interest in compensating crime victims from the fruits of crime, this law is not narrowly tailored to that purpose. Citing the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Simon & Schuster, the court found the California law is fundamentally flawed and overinclusive because it confiscates all income from a wide range of expressive works, regardless of their overall theme or subject, simply because they include a substantial account of a prior felony. The statute's limitations to convicted felons and its exemption for 'passing mention' are insufficient to cure this constitutional defect, as it still discourages protected speech far beyond what is necessary to serve the state's interest.
Concurring - Brown, J.
Yes. The statute is unconstitutional because it shares the essential flaws condemned in Simon & Schuster. However, not all 'Son of Sam' laws are unconstitutional. A state may constitutionally seize a criminal's assets to compensate a victim, and it may seize the fruits of a crime to render it unprofitable, provided the law is content-neutral. The constitutional defect in this statute is that it improperly singles out income from expressive activity—'storytelling'—for a special burden, making it an impermissible content-based regulation. A law that allowed victims to recover from all of a criminal's assets, or a law that targeted all profits from criminal notoriety (not just from storytelling), could potentially survive constitutional scrutiny.
Analysis:
This decision aligns California law with the U.S. Supreme Court's precedent in Simon & Schuster, solidifying the principle that 'Son of Sam' laws targeting the content of a criminal's speech are subject to strict scrutiny. It invalidates the 'storytelling' provision of California's statute, forcing the legislature to find content-neutral means to achieve the goal of victim compensation. The ruling clarifies that while states have a compelling interest in preventing criminals from profiting from their crimes, they cannot create financial disincentives that broadly chill protected speech, such as autobiographies or works of social commentary that may include descriptions of past crimes.
