Keck v. Jackson
122 Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d 668, 1979 Ariz. LEXIS 260 (1979)
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Rule of Law:
Arizona recognizes a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress when a plaintiff, in the zone of danger, witnesses an injury to a closely related person and suffers emotional distress that manifests as a physical injury.
Facts:
- Dorothy Keck and her mother, Beatrice Gillespie, stopped their car in the emergency parking lane of Interstate 40 near Flagstaff, Arizona, to repair a flat tire.
- Both Dorothy Keck and Beatrice Gillespie were inside the parked vehicle.
- Martha F. Jackson, allegedly under the influence of alcohol, negligently operated her vehicle, causing it to collide with the Keck vehicle.
- Dorothy Keck received serious physical injuries from the impact of the collision.
- Beatrice Gillespie received fatal injuries in the accident.
- Beatrice Gillespie died three months after the accident, following continuous hospitalization.
- Dorothy Keck suffered severe emotional and physical distress from witnessing her mother's injuries and suffering, both at the accident scene and during the prolonged hospitalization, as well as from her mother's death.
Procedural Posture:
- Dorothy Keck (plaintiff/appellant) filed a complaint against Martha F. Jackson (defendant) in Superior Court, which included a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count One).
- The Superior Court dismissed Count One of Keck's complaint, ruling that no cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress existed in Arizona.
- Keck appealed the Superior Court's dismissal of Count One to the Arizona Court of Appeals.
- The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the Superior Court's order, allowing the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress to proceed.
- Jackson (defendant/appellee at this stage) filed a petition for review of the Court of Appeals' decision with the Arizona Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does Arizona recognize a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress when a plaintiff, also at risk of bodily harm, witnesses a closely related person suffer fatal injuries, provided the emotional distress is manifested as a physical injury?
Opinions:
Majority - Hays, Justice
Yes, Arizona recognizes a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress when a plaintiff, also at risk of bodily harm, witnesses a closely related person suffer fatal injuries, provided the emotional distress is manifested as a physical injury. The court acknowledged the historical confusion in this area of law and indicated an inclination to adopt the rule of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 313, which allows for recovery if the actor's negligence created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the bystander, otherwise than solely by knowledge of harm to a third person. The court established specific limitations for recovery: 1) the shock or mental anguish must be manifested as a physical injury (citing Restatement § 436A), because damages for emotional disturbance alone are too speculative; 2) the emotional distress must result from witnessing an injury to a person with whom the plaintiff has a close personal relationship, whether by consanguinity or otherwise; and 3) the plaintiff/bystander must themselves have been in the 'zone of danger' such that the negligent defendant created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them. Given that Dorothy Keck's complaint alleged a mother-daughter relationship, severe emotional and physical distress, and accompanying physical injury, a valid cause of action was stated. However, any recoverable damages must be proximately caused by the emotional disturbance that occurred at the time of the accident, not thereafter.
Analysis:
This case significantly alters the landscape of tort law in Arizona by formally recognizing a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, adopting a modified 'zone of danger' rule. By requiring both a close relationship and a physical manifestation of emotional distress, the court carves out a middle ground, expanding recovery beyond the 'impact rule' but limiting it to avoid speculative claims and overly broad liability. This precedent will guide future cases in determining the scope of bystander recovery, emphasizing the need for concrete evidence of injury and a direct threat to the plaintiff's own physical safety, alongside a profound personal connection to the primary victim.
