Kazadi v. State
467 Md. 1 (2020)
Rule of Law:
A criminal trial court must, upon request, ask prospective jurors during voir dire if they are unwilling or unable to comply with jury instructions on the presumption of innocence, the State's burden of proof, and the defendant's right not to testify, overruling prior precedent. Additionally, a witness's undocumented immigration status or deportation order is not discoverable or a proper subject for cross-examination for impeachment unless there are specific allegations of quid pro quo or leniency related to immigration in exchange for testimony.
Facts:
- Tshibangu Kazadi was charged in Baltimore City with first-degree murder, use of a firearm in a crime of violence, and wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun.
- Kazadi requested that the trial court ask prospective jurors during jury selection if they were unwilling or unable to follow instructions on the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and the defendant's right not to testify.
- Kazadi filed a motion to compel discovery of Alien Registration Numbers, immigration case numbers, and deportation paperwork for State's witness S.L. and her son M.L., whom Kazadi believed were undocumented immigrants subject to deportation.
- Kazadi contended that S.L. and M.L.'s alleged noncompliance with a deportation order demonstrated a character trait of untruthfulness and that their testimony could make them eligible for relief from deportation, thus providing a motive to testify falsely.
- S.L. had previously indicated to law enforcement that she was hesitant to come forward with information due to an outstanding deportation order, and her social worker reportedly told her that the Baltimore Police Department would not enforce the deportation order.
- S.L. and M.L. testified that they did not expect any immigration-related benefit in exchange for testifying, though S.L. received moving expenses and rent for a new home from the State's Attorney's Office.
- S.L. testified that she saw Kazadi hide a gun and run into his basement after hearing gunshots and identified him as the person who “killed someone.”
- M.L. testified that he heard a gunshot, saw Kazadi holding a revolver and shoot another man, and then run toward his house, and identified Kazadi as the shooter.
Procedural Posture:
- Tshibangu Kazadi was charged in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City with various crimes, including first-degree murder.
- The Circuit Court for Baltimore City declined to ask Kazadi's requested voir dire questions concerning fundamental legal principles and denied his motion to compel discovery of State's witnesses' immigration-related information, granting the State's motion in limine to preclude cross-examination on their immigration status.
- A jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City found Kazadi guilty of second-degree murder and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence.
- Kazadi appealed his convictions to the Court of Special Appeals.
- The Court of Special Appeals affirmed Kazadi's convictions.
- Kazadi's appellate counsel filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Court of Appeals of Maryland, which was granted.
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Issue:
1. Does a trial court, upon request, abuse its discretion by refusing to ask prospective jurors during voir dire whether they are unwilling or unable to follow jury instructions on the presumption of innocence, the State's burden of proof, and the defendant's right not to testify? 2. Absent additional circumstances, must a prosecutor disclose a State's witness's undocumented immigration status or deportation order during discovery, and is such information a proper subject for cross-examination to show character for untruthfulness or motive to testify falsely?
Opinions:
Majority - Watts, J.
1. Yes, a trial court does abuse its discretion by refusing to ask, upon request, voir dire questions concerning a prospective juror’s ability and willingness to follow jury instructions on the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and a defendant’s right to remain silent, as this Court's prior holding in Twining v. State (1964) is based on outdated reasoning and has been superseded by significant changes in the law. The Court overruled Twining's holding that such voir dire questions were inappropriate. Twining's reasoning was primarily based on the outdated premise that jury instructions were “advisory only” in Maryland, a premise explicitly overturned by Stevenson v. State (1980) and Montgomery v. State (1981), which established that jury instructions, particularly on fundamental rights, are binding. Current empirical studies show widespread juror misunderstanding or misapplication of the presumption of innocence and burden of proof, making voir dire essential to identify biases that jury instructions cannot later cure. Furthermore, the claim in Twining that asking such questions was “generally recognized” as inappropriate was tenuous even then and is no longer true, as a split among jurisdictions exists, with many (including the Sixth Circuit) requiring or permitting these questions. The inability or unwillingness to follow instructions on these fundamental rights constitutes a “specific cause for disqualification” or a bias “related to the defendant” under Collins v. State (2019), warranting mandatory voir dire questions upon request to safeguard the right to a fair and impartial jury. 2. No, absent additional circumstances such as allegations of quid pro quo or leniency in an immigration case, a State's witness's status as an undocumented immigrant or a person subject to a deportation order does not, without more, show character for untruthfulness or a motive to testify falsely, and thus is not required to be disclosed by a prosecutor during discovery or a proper subject of cross-examination. The Court held that a witness's immigration status is not generally relevant to credibility under Maryland Rules 4-263(d)(6)(A), 5-608(b), and 5-616(a)(4), because it does not inherently make a witness more likely to testify falsely. Mere speculation that a deportation order might stem from falsehoods is insufficient to establish relevance for impeachment. The Court distinguished cases like Carrero-Vasquez v. State (2013) where a direct link existed between the witness's immigration status, the crime, and a potential motive to fabricate testimony. In Kazadi's case, there was no evidence of any special relationship between the witnesses and the State regarding immigration benefits or leniency in exchange for testimony.
Dissenting - McDonald, J.
1. No, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by not asking the requested voir dire questions because the scope of voir dire questions about legal principles should remain committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, not mandated by the Court. Justice McDonald argued that the majority's new rule inappropriately constrains the long-established “sound discretion” of trial judges in conducting voir dire, aligning Maryland law with a minority view among jurisdictions. He contended that the concept of “limited voir dire” in Maryland is solely for identifying jurors to be struck for cause, not for aiding peremptory strikes, and that mandating such questions leads to an expansion of voir dire beyond this purpose. He also highlighted the irony that the new mandatory questions are not required in jurisdictions with broader voir dire, and that applying this new rule retroactively to reverse convictions where trial judges followed existing precedent is an “unwieldy and unnecessary way to modify the voir dire process,” suggesting that such fundamental changes should be implemented through rulemaking, not adjudication.
Dissenting - Getty, J.
1. No, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to ask Mr. Kazadi’s requested voir dire questions because Twining v. State and its progeny remain good law, and questions regarding a juror’s willingness to follow purely legal principles should not be mandatory. Justice Getty asserted that the majority misinterprets Twining's foundational reasoning. She argued that Twining's primary bases were that jury instructions would “fully and fairly cover” the legal principles and that it was “inappropriate” to question jurors on law during voir dire, with the “advisory only” nature of instructions being merely reinforcing dicta. She emphasized that subsequent cases like State v. Logan (2006) and Stewart v. State (2007) reaffirmed the principle that questions about following legal instructions are “disfavored” even after jury instructions became binding, demonstrating that Twining's core holding was not superseded. Justice Getty concluded that overruling Twining on the basis of misconstrued reasoning violates stare decisis and that such questions should remain discretionary to avoid complicating voir dire and diverging from its limited purpose in Maryland.
Analysis:
This case represents a significant shift in Maryland's voir dire jurisprudence by overruling longstanding precedent in Twining v. State and its progeny. By mandating certain voir dire questions upon request, the Court of Appeals strengthens a criminal defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury by proactively identifying prospective jurors unable or unwilling to adhere to fundamental legal principles like the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof. This decision underscores the Court's commitment to protecting constitutional rights over judicial discretion in areas deemed critical for due process. While potentially simplifying appellate review for these specific questions, it may also open the door to future requests for mandatory voir dire questions on other foundational legal concepts, potentially expanding Maryland's traditionally “limited voir dire.”
