Kawaauhau et vir v. Geiger
523 U.S. 57 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
For a debt to be non-dischargeable under the "willful and malicious injury" exception in § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor must have intended to cause the injury itself, not merely have intended to perform the act that led to the injury. Debts arising from merely negligent or reckless conduct are dischargeable.
Facts:
- In January 1983, Margaret Kawaauhau sought treatment from Dr. Paul Geiger for a foot injury.
- Dr. Geiger admitted Kawaauhau to the hospital and, to minimize her costs, prescribed oral penicillin despite knowing that intravenous penicillin would be more effective.
- Geiger then left on a business trip, during which time other physicians arranged for Kawaauhau to be transferred to an infectious disease specialist.
- Upon his return, Geiger canceled the transfer and discontinued all antibiotics, incorrectly believing the infection had subsided.
- As a result of the inadequate treatment, Kawaauhau's condition deteriorated, and her right leg had to be amputated below the knee.
- Dr. Geiger did not carry medical malpractice insurance.
Procedural Posture:
- Margaret and Solomon Kawaauhau sued Dr. Geiger for medical malpractice in a trial court.
- A jury found Dr. Geiger liable and awarded the Kawaauhaus approximately $355,000 in damages.
- Dr. Geiger filed for bankruptcy and sought to discharge the malpractice judgment debt.
- The Kawaauhaus initiated a proceeding in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, arguing the debt was non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(6).
- The Bankruptcy Court found the debt non-dischargeable, concluding Geiger's conduct was "willful and malicious."
- The U.S. District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's decision.
- A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the District Court.
- The Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the panel's reversal, holding that the § 523(a)(6) exception is confined to intentional torts, creating a circuit split.
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Issue:
Does a debt arising from a medical malpractice judgment, based on negligent or reckless conduct, constitute a debt for "willful and malicious injury" under § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code, making it non-dischargeable?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Ginsburg
No. A debt arising from a medical malpractice judgment attributable to negligent or reckless conduct does not fall within the § 523(a)(6) exception for "willful and malicious injury" and is therefore dischargeable. The statutory language requires a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury. The word "willful" modifies the word "injury," indicating that the actor must intend the consequences of the act, which is the hallmark of an intentional tort. To interpret the statute more broadly, as the Kawaauhaus urge, would improperly sweep in a wide range of conduct where injury is unintended, such as a knowing breach of contract or an ordinary traffic accident. Such a broad reading would also render other specific exceptions in the Bankruptcy Code, like § 523(a)(9) for drunk driving injuries, superfluous. Precedent like Tinker v. Colwell is confined to the category of traditional intentional torts, and later cases like Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co. clarified that negligent or reckless acts do not suffice to establish a "willful and malicious" injury.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the scope of the "willful and malicious injury" exception to bankruptcy discharge, resolving a circuit split. It clarifies that recklessness or gross negligence is insufficient; a creditor must prove the debtor possessed an actual intent to cause the resulting harm. This raises the evidentiary bar for creditors seeking to prevent the discharge of debts arising from torts that are not classic intentional torts, thereby strengthening the "fresh start" policy of bankruptcy for debtors. Following this case, courts must distinguish between an intent to act and an intent to injure when applying § 523(a)(6).
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