Katherine Lees v. Carthage College
91 Fed. R. Serv. 159, 2013 WL 1590038, 714 F.3d 516 (2013)
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Rule of Law:
In a professional negligence case requiring expert testimony, aspirational industry guidelines or recommended practices may serve as a reliable basis for an expert opinion under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, informing the standard of care, but reliance on crime statistics must reliably differentiate between types of incidents to be admissible. The standard of care for premises security involves the specific actions an average institution would undertake, not merely general foreseeability of harm.
Facts:
- Katherine Lees began her freshman year at Carthage College in the fall of 2008, residing in Tarble Hall, an all-female dormitory.
- Tarble Hall was locked 24 hours a day, accessible by student ID during certain hours, and had a basement door that lacked a prop alarm, meaning it could be propped open indefinitely without alerting security.
- Resident assistants in Tarble Hall encouraged students to follow an “open door policy” to promote socializing among residents.
- In the early morning hours of September 21, 2008, Lees was in her room with her door propped open when two young men entered her doorway and spoke to her.
- After briefly leaving, the men returned around 12:30 a.m., entered Lees’s room, turned off the lights, closed the door, and one man raped Lees while the other held her down.
- Lees punched the second man, causing both assailants to flee; she believed they were Carthage students due to their clothing, but they were never identified.
- Lees subsequently withdrew from Carthage College after the attack.
Procedural Posture:
- Katherine Lees filed a negligence action against Carthage College and its insurer, Lexington Insurance Company (and initially RSUI Indemnity Company, which was later dismissed), in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, invoking diversity jurisdiction.
- Lees sought to introduce the expert testimony of Dr. Daniel Kennedy, a premises-security expert, as evidence of the standard of care Carthage College was required to meet regarding campus safety.
- Carthage College moved to exclude Dr. Kennedy’s expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and simultaneously moved for summary judgment, arguing Lees had failed to present reliable expert evidence establishing the relevant standard of care.
- The district court (Judge Rudolph T. Randa) excluded Dr. Kennedy’s testimony, finding it inadmissible primarily because he relied on aspirational industry standards and failed to account for the distinction between acquaintance rape and stranger rape in Carthage’s prior crime history.
- With Dr. Kennedy’s testimony excluded, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of Carthage College, concluding that Lees lacked the evidence necessary to prove her negligence claim.
- Lees, as Plaintiff-Appellant, timely appealed the district court's judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Carthage College and Lexington Insurance Company were the Defendants-Appellees.
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Issue:
Does Federal Rule of Evidence 702 permit a premises-security expert to rely on aspirational industry standards and specific security flaws to establish the standard of care in a college negligence case, or must the expert rely exclusively on comparative analysis of similarly situated institutions and rigorously differentiate between types of prior incidents?
Opinions:
Majority - Sykes, Circuit Judge
Yes, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 permits a premises-security expert to rely, in part, on aspirational industry standards and specific factual deficiencies like an unalarmed door to establish the standard of care in a college negligence case, provided the methodology is sound, but general crime statistics must be reliably applied to the specific facts, such as differentiating between types of incidents. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s general gatekeeping function under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which requires expert testimony to be relevant and reliable, but found an abuse of discretion in certain exclusions. The court reiterated that the Daubert framework, as expanded by Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, applies to all expert testimony and emphasizes a flexible inquiry tailored to the specific expertise. The court held that Dr. Kennedy’s reliance on the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA) guidelines was a methodologically sound practice for an expert opinion in premises security, even though these guidelines are aspirational and not formal industry standards. Their aspirational nature goes to the weight of the testimony, not its admissibility under Rule 702. Similarly, the court rejected the district court's requirement that Dr. Kennedy specifically compare security practices at colleges similarly situated to Carthage, noting that strict reliance on "community standards" is not necessary for admissibility and Wisconsin does not follow the locality rule for professional negligence. This, too, was deemed a matter of weight, not admissibility. However, the court upheld the exclusion of Dr. Kennedy’s reliance on Carthage’s past crime statistics (eight forcible sexual offenses between 2003-2007) without distinguishing between acquaintance rape and stranger rape. Since Lees's assault was stranger rape and the prior incidents were acquaintance rapes, the court found the expert's failure to account for this distinction rendered the application of principles unreliable for this specific fact. Crucially, the court found that Dr. Kennedy's testimony about the specific security deficiency of the insecure basement door (lack of a prop alarm) was admissible. This testimony was directly relevant, supported by reliable principles (IACLEA standards), and reliably linked to the facts of the case. The court also clarified that, under Wisconsin negligence law, expert testimony in professional negligence cases like premises security must establish the standard of care—the specific security measures an average college would reasonably undertake—rather than merely the foreseeability of harm, which relates to breach. Dr. Kennedy's admissible testimony directly addressed this standard of care. Because some of Dr. Kennedy’s expert testimony was admissible and provided evidence on the standard of care, Lees had raised a genuine factual dispute, making summary judgment improper. The court vacated the summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the Seventh Circuit's approach to Daubert challenges for non-scientific expert testimony in negligence claims, particularly in campus security and professional liability contexts. It establishes that courts must carefully distinguish between factors affecting the admissibility of expert testimony (reliable methodology) and those affecting its evidentiary weight (persuasiveness to the jury), preventing district courts from excluding testimony based on perceived weaknesses that should instead be addressed through vigorous cross-examination. Furthermore, it reinforces the precise nature of the "standard of care" element in Wisconsin professional negligence law, emphasizing that expert testimony must articulate specific reasonable practices rather than broadly addressing foreseeability. This ruling creates a clearer pathway for plaintiffs in similar premises-security cases to introduce expert evidence, potentially lowering the bar for admissibility of industry guidelines while still demanding a rigorous, fact-specific application of expert principles.
