Kastigar v. United States

Supreme Court of the United States
406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A grant of immunity from the use and derivative use of compelled testimony is coextensive with the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and is therefore sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege.

Facts:

Petitioners were subpoenaed to appear and testify before a United States grand jury in the Central District of California.
The U.S. Government anticipated that the petitioners would invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.
Prior to their appearance, the government applied for a court order to compel their testimony under a grant of immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003.
The statute provided for immunity from the use of the compelled testimony and any evidence directly or indirectly derived from it ('use and derivative use' immunity), not immunity from prosecution for the transaction itself ('transactional' immunity).
Petitioners appeared before the grand jury but refused to answer questions, asserting their Fifth Amendment privilege despite the court's grant of immunity.

Procedural Posture:

The U.S. Government applied to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California for an order compelling petitioners to testify before a grand jury under a grant of immunity.
Petitioners opposed the order, arguing the immunity statute was unconstitutional.
The District Court granted the government's order and compelled the testimony.
When petitioners refused to testify despite the order, the District Court found them in civil contempt and ordered them into custody.
Petitioners, as appellants, appealed the contempt order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment of contempt.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Premium Content

Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief

You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture

Issue:

Does a federal statute granting immunity from the use and derivative use of compelled testimony, rather than full transactional immunity, violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination?

Opinions:

Majority - Mr. Justice Powell

No, the federal statute does not violate the Fifth Amendment. A grant of immunity from the use and derivative use of compelled testimony is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination. The Fifth Amendment's sole concern is to protect against being forced to give testimony that leads to the infliction of criminal penalties. Use and derivative use immunity achieves this by prohibiting the prosecution from using the compelled testimony in any respect, thereby ensuring it cannot lead to criminal penalties against the witness. While transactional immunity affords broader protection, the privilege does not require it. This ruling distinguishes the broad language in Counselman v. Hitchcock as unnecessary dictum, holding that Counselman's core reasoning was based on the prior statute's failure to prohibit the use of evidence derived from the testimony. The Court affirms the framework from Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, holding that this form of immunity leaves the witness and the government in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed the privilege.

Dissenting - Mr. Justice Douglas

Yes, the statute violates the Fifth Amendment. The long-standing precedent from Counselman v. Hitchcock correctly established that a valid immunity statute must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which the testimony relates (transactional immunity). Use immunity is insufficient because it permits the government to compel testimony without fully removing the criminality associated with it. The decision in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n did not overrule Counselman; it addressed the separate issue of federalism and inter-jurisdictional immunity. By allowing the government to compel a confession of crimes with only use immunity, the Court unconstitutionally dilutes the Self-Incrimination Clause.

Dissenting - Mr. Justice Marshall

Yes, the statute violates the Fifth Amendment. While use and derivative use immunity may be sufficient in theory, it is inadequate in practice to protect a witness's rights. It is nearly impossible for a witness to prove that compelled testimony was not used as an investigatory lead, and even a prosecutor acting in good faith cannot be certain that the testimony was not used somewhere within the complex investigative bureaucracy. The government's burden to prove an independent source is an insufficient safeguard against the subtle and often untraceable ways compelled testimony can taint a subsequent prosecution. To truly place the witness in the same position as if they had remained silent, the government must grant full transactional immunity.

Analysis:

This landmark decision resolved the constitutional debate over the required scope of witness immunity, validating Congress's shift from 'transactional' to 'use and derivative use' immunity. This significantly enhanced the government's investigative power, especially in complex criminal enterprises like organized crime, as it allows prosecutors to compel testimony from witnesses without providing them with a complete 'immunity bath' from prosecution. The case also established the critical procedural safeguard known as a 'Kastigar hearing,' where prosecutors in a subsequent case bear the heavy burden of proving that their evidence was derived from a source wholly independent of the immunized testimony, a standard that remains central to modern immunity law.

Gunnerbot

AI-powered case assistant

Loaded: Kastigar v. United States (1972)

Try: "What was the holding?" or "Explain the dissent"

Premium Feature