Kasi v. Commonwealth
1998 Va. LEXIS 140, 256 Va. 407, 508 S.E.2d 57 (1998)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A court's jurisdiction to try a criminal defendant is not impaired by the defendant's forcible abduction from a foreign country, even if the seizure violates an extradition treaty or other international conventions.
Facts:
- On January 25, 1993, Mir Aimal Kasi opened fire with an AK-47 on vehicles stopped at an entrance to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) headquarters in Fairfax County, Virginia.
- Kasi killed CIA employees Frank Darling and Lansing Bennett and wounded three others.
- Kasi had purchased the weapon three days prior to the attack.
- The day after the shootings, Kasi fled the United States and returned to his native country of Pakistan.
- For nearly four and a half years, Kasi traveled in Afghanistan, with brief visits to Pakistan.
- On June 15, 1997, armed FBI agents apprehended Kasi in a hotel room in Pakistan.
- During a 12-hour flight from Pakistan to Fairfax County in FBI custody, Kasi was advised of his Miranda rights and signed a written waiver.
- After waiving his rights, Kasi provided a detailed oral and written confession, stating he shot the victims for political reasons related to U.S. actions in Muslim countries.
Procedural Posture:
- On February 16, 1993, a grand jury indicted Mir Aimal Kasi on charges of capital murder, first-degree murder, malicious wounding, and use of a firearm in commission of a felony.
- Following Kasi's apprehension and return to Virginia, he pleaded not guilty and was tried by a jury in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County.
- The jury found Kasi guilty on all charges.
- In the subsequent penalty phase of the trial, the jury fixed his punishment for the capital murder at death.
- On February 4, 1998, the trial court sentenced Kasi to death in accordance with the jury's verdict, in addition to sentences for the other convictions.
- The death sentence came before the Supreme Court of Virginia for automatic review, which was consolidated with Kasi's appeal of his capital murder conviction.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the forcible abduction of a foreign national from another country, in potential violation of an extradition treaty and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, divest a state court of jurisdiction or require the suppression of a confession obtained after the abduction?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Compton
No. A court is not divested of jurisdiction over a criminal defendant simply because the defendant was forcibly abducted from a foreign country. Citing the U.S. Supreme Court case United States v. Alvarez-Machain, the court held that the power of a court to try a person for a crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction.' The extradition treaty between the United States and Pakistan does not contain any provision that affirmatively prohibits such abductions. Furthermore, any violation of the Vienna Convention, such as failing to promptly notify a foreign national of their right to consular assistance, does not warrant the suppression of a voluntary confession. The court found overwhelming and uncontradicted evidence that Kasi's waiver of rights was knowing and intelligent and that his subsequent confession was entirely voluntary, free from any coercion, threats, or promises.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms the long-standing Ker-Frisbie doctrine in Virginia, holding that the means by which a defendant is brought before the court does not affect the court's jurisdiction to preside over the case. It solidifies that even clear violations of international law or treaties during a defendant's apprehension abroad will not serve as a basis to dismiss a criminal case or suppress evidence, unless the treaty explicitly provides for such a remedy. This ruling significantly limits the ability of defendants captured internationally to challenge their prosecution on the basis of their seizure, placing the focus squarely on the voluntariness of any subsequent confession and the fairness of the trial itself.
