Karsten Koch v. Village of Hartland
43 F.4th 747 (2022)
Sections
Rule of Law:
A law violates the retroactivity prong of the Ex Post Facto Clause if it attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment, regardless of whether it regulates present conduct.
Facts:
- Karsten Koch was convicted of sexual assault crimes involving a child and served a seven-year prison sentence.
- Following his release, Koch sought to move to the Village of Hartland to be closer to his employment and family.
- Koch secured a landlord in the Village willing to rent a property to him.
- In 2018, subsequent to Koch's conviction, the Village enacted an Ordinance prohibiting 'Designated Offenders' (sex offenders) from establishing residence until the Village's 'saturation level' dropped to a specific factor.
- At the time Koch attempted to move, the saturation level effectively created a total ban on new sex offender residents.
- Solely due to the Ordinance, the landlord was prohibited from renting to Koch.
- Koch remains unable to reside in the Village and must commute from his parents' home.
Procedural Posture:
- Koch filed a lawsuit against the Village of Hartland in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- Both Koch and the Village filed cross-motions for summary judgment regarding the constitutionality of the Ordinance.
- The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Village, applying circuit precedent that deemed the law prospective rather than retroactive.
- Koch appealed the District Court's judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Is a municipal ordinance restricting sex offender residency retroactive under the Ex Post Facto Clause when applied to an individual whose qualifying conviction occurred prior to the ordinance's enactment?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge St. Eve
Yes. The Court holds that the Ordinance is retroactive because it imposes new legal disabilities based on conduct that was completed before the law was passed. The Court explicitly overrules its prior precedents, Leach and Vasquez, which had held that laws regulating future conduct (like residency) based on past history were not retroactive. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Weaver v. Graham, the majority establishes that the critical inquiry is whether a law changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date. Because the Ordinance prevents Koch from living in the Village based entirely on his pre-Ordinance conviction, it attaches a new disability to a past event. The Court clarifies that while the law is retroactive, the case must be remanded to determine if it is also 'punitive,' which is the second necessary requirement for an Ex Post Facto violation.
Concurring - Judge Kirsch
Yes. The Ordinance is retroactive, though the proper analysis relies on Vartelas v. Holder rather than solely on Weaver. The concurrence argues that the majority should not have overruled Leach and Vasquez because those cases were correctly decided under the Vartelas framework, which distinguishes between laws targeting 'past misconduct' (retroactive) and laws addressing 'postenactment dangers' (prospective). Because the Village's Ordinance restricts residency based solely on the past conviction without identifying a specific postenactment danger—unlike the proximity restrictions in Vasquez—it is retroactive. However, the concurring judge believes the majority's broad application of Weaver ignores necessary limiting principles established by the Supreme Court.
Analysis:
This decision marks a significant shift in Seventh Circuit jurisprudence regarding the Ex Post Facto Clause. By overruling the Leach-Vasquez rule, the Court aligns itself with the majority of other circuits and Supreme Court precedent, making it easier for plaintiffs to prove that sex-offender registry and residency laws are 'retroactive.' Previously, the government could successfully defend such laws by arguing they merely regulated current housing choices. Now, the government must litigate the more complex 'punitive' intent-effects inquiry. This places a higher burden on municipalities to demonstrate that their restrictions are civil and regulatory rather than punitive measures disguised as public safety ordinances.
Gunnerbot
AI-powered case assistant
Loaded: Karsten Koch v. Village of Hartland (2022)
Try: "What was the holding?" or "Explain the dissent"