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Karr v. Castle

District Court, D. Delaware
768 F. Supp. 1087 (1991)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A government employee's involuntary separation does not implicate a constitutionally protected liberty interest unless the government employer publicizes a false and stigmatizing charge that forecloses the individual's freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities. A charge of 'substandard performance' is not sufficiently stigmatizing, and a more serious charge like 'dereliction of duty' does not trigger due process if it is not publicized by the government.


Facts:

  • Jon T. Karr, a Captain in the Delaware Army National Guard (DEARNG), was serving a three-year tour in the Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) program.
  • Two of his superior officers, Lieutenant Colonel Norman Y. Cochran and Brigadier General Oscar E. Trivits, recommended Karr's involuntary separation from the program before the end of his tour.
  • The recommendations characterized certain actions by Karr as constituting 'dereliction of duty' and 'substandard performance'.
  • Karr contended that the characterization of his actions was false and that he was separated in retaliation for angering his superiors.
  • Karr was involuntarily separated from the AGR program.
  • The official discharge form (DD Form 214) given to Karr stated the reason for separation was 'Involuntary Separation — Substandard performance,' not 'dereliction of duty'.
  • Karr alleged that his separation has prevented him from procuring other employment commensurate with his education and prior experience, including as a university professor.

Procedural Posture:

  • Jon T. Karr sued various Delaware Army National Guard officers in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware.
  • The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
  • The district court initially granted summary judgment for Karr, finding the Guard's separation procedures violated his procedural due process rights, and ordered his reinstatement.
  • The State defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's summary judgment ruling.
  • The United States government moved to intervene as a defendant and also filed a motion for reconsideration.
  • The court granted the United States' motion to intervene and is now ruling on the defendants' motions for reconsideration.

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Issue:

Does an involuntary separation from a National Guard program for alleged 'dereliction of duty' and 'substandard performance' implicate a constitutionally protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause when the government does not publicize the 'dereliction of duty' charge to potential employers?


Opinions:

Majority - Murray M. Schwartz

No, the involuntary separation does not implicate a constitutionally protected liberty interest. For a government employee's separation to implicate a liberty interest, the employee must establish that the basis for the separation was false, stigmatizing, and publicized by the government employer in a way that impugns their character and reputation. While a charge of 'dereliction of duty' might be sufficiently stigmatizing, as it is a crime under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, it was not publicized by the DEARNG in this case. The official reason provided on Karr's discharge paperwork was 'substandard performance,' which is not sufficiently derogatory to trigger a liberty interest. The court rejected Karr's argument that he was forced to publicize the 'dereliction of duty' charge himself to potential employers, holding that self-publication does not impute responsibility to the government defendants. Because the government did not publicize a stigmatizing charge, Karr failed to assert a protected liberty interest, and therefore no procedural due process protections were required.



Analysis:

This decision refines the 'stigma-plus' test for reputational liberty interests by heavily emphasizing the requirement of government publication. It establishes that even a potentially damaging internal characterization of an employee's conduct, such as 'dereliction of duty,' is insufficient to trigger due process if the official, public reason for termination is a less-stigmatizing one like 'substandard performance.' The ruling places a significant burden on plaintiffs to prove that the government itself disseminated the harmful information, making it more difficult for discharged public employees to bring procedural due process claims based on reputational harm, especially when the employee is the source of the publication.

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