Kansas v. Crane
534 U.S. 407 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
The Due Process Clause does not require a finding that a sexually violent predator has a total or complete inability to control their behavior to be civilly committed. However, it does require proof of serious difficulty in controlling such behavior, sufficient to distinguish the individual from a typical criminal recidivist.
Facts:
- Michael Crane had prior convictions for sexual offenses, including lewd and lascivious behavior and aggravated sexual battery.
- One incident involved Crane exposing himself to a tanning salon attendant.
- A second incident on the same day involved Crane entering a video store, exposing himself to the clerk, grabbing her by the neck, demanding oral sex, and threatening rape before fleeing.
- After Crane completed his criminal sentence, the State of Kansas initiated proceedings to have him indefinitely committed as a 'sexually violent predator' under state law.
- Psychiatric experts for the state diagnosed Crane with exhibitionism and antisocial personality disorder.
- The state's experts testified that while Crane's condition made him likely to reoffend, his disorders did not impair his volitional control to the degree that he was completely unable to control his dangerous behavior.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Kansas filed a petition in a Kansas District Court to have Michael Crane adjudicated a sexually violent predator.
- The trial court denied Crane's motion for summary judgment, which argued that the Constitution required the State to prove he was unable to control his behavior.
- Following a trial, a jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Crane was a sexually violent predator, and the district court ordered his commitment.
- Crane, as appellant, appealed the commitment order to the Kansas Supreme Court.
- The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order, holding that the U.S. Constitution requires a specific finding that the individual cannot control their dangerous behavior.
- The State of Kansas, as petitioner, was granted a writ of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court to review the decision of the Kansas Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does the Due Process Clause permit the civil commitment of a sexually violent predator without any finding that the person has an impaired capacity to control their dangerous behavior?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Breyer
No. While the Constitution does not require a finding of a total inability to control behavior, it does require some proof of a lack of control to distinguish civil commitment from criminal punishment. The Court’s prior decision in Kansas v. Hendricks did not require proof of a 'total or complete lack of control,' as evidenced by its use of the phrase 'difficult, if not impossible,' to describe the necessary impairment. An absolutist standard would be unworkable and prevent the commitment of dangerous individuals. However, the Constitution requires 'proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior' to ensure that civil commitment is reserved for individuals with a special and serious lack of ability to control their conduct, distinguishing them from 'dangerous but typical recidivist[s]' who are dealt with through the criminal justice system. This standard is flexible and context-dependent, considering the nature of the psychiatric diagnosis and the severity of the mental abnormality, rather than a rigid bright-line rule.
Dissenting - Justice Scalia
Yes. The Constitution permits commitment under the Kansas statute as written, without requiring a separate, additional finding of impaired control. The majority misinterprets Kansas v. Hendricks, which upheld the very same statute by holding that the statutory requirement of a 'mental abnormality' that 'predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses' inherently satisfies the constitutional standard. The statute's existing elements already narrow the class of committable persons to 'those who are unable to control their dangerousness,' without needing a separate jury finding on that specific issue. The majority's new, vague requirement of 'serious difficulty in controlling behavior' provides no guidance to lower courts on how to instruct a jury and irresponsibly creates an indeterminate legal standard. This decision improperly reverses a recent precedent and undermines the Court's authority.
Analysis:
This case clarifies and refines the substantive due process standard for civil commitment of sexually violent predators established in Kansas v. Hendricks. By rejecting the polar opposite positions—that either total lack of control is required or no proof of impaired control is needed at all—the Court created a more nuanced, but also more ambiguous, middle-ground test. The holding requires states to prove a 'serious difficulty in controlling behavior,' a flexible standard that depends on the specific psychiatric evidence in each case. This decision ensures that civil commitment cannot be used as a substitute for criminal punishment for all repeat offenders, but its vagueness has likely led to further litigation over what quantum of evidence is sufficient to meet the 'serious difficulty' threshold.
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