Kansas v. Cheever
134 S. Ct. 596, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 9020, 187 L. Ed. 2d 519 (2013)
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Rule of Law:
When a criminal defendant presents expert testimony about their mental state to argue they lacked the requisite intent to commit a crime, the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the prosecution from introducing rebuttal evidence from a court-ordered mental evaluation.
Facts:
- On January 19, 2005, Scott Cheever shot and killed Matthew Samuels, a sheriff of Greenwood County, Kansas, and shot at other local law enforcement officers.
- In the hours before the shooting, Cheever and his friends had cooked and smoked methamphetamine at a home near Hilltop, Kansas.
- When one of Cheever’s friends warned him that officers were en route to arrest him on an unrelated outstanding warrant, Cheever rushed outside, but his car had a flat tire, so he returned inside and hid with a loaded .44 caliber revolver.
- Cheever heard footsteps, stepped out, and shot Samuels, who was climbing the stairs, then shot Samuels again and fired at a deputy, a detective, and SWAT team members.
- In a prior federal prosecution, Cheever filed notice that he intended to introduce expert evidence that methamphetamine intoxication negated his ability to form specific intent.
- The Federal District Court ordered Cheever to submit to a psychiatric evaluation by forensic psychiatrist Michael Welner to assess how methamphetamine use affected him.
- At his second state prosecution, Cheever presented a voluntary-intoxication defense, offering expert testimony from Dr. Roswell Lee Evans, who opined that Cheever’s long-term methamphetamine use damaged his brain and that he was acutely intoxicated and heavily influenced by methamphetamine at the time of the shooting.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Kansas charged Scott Cheever with capital murder.
- Shortly thereafter, in an unrelated case, the Kansas Supreme Court found the State’s death penalty scheme unconstitutional.
- State prosecutors dismissed their charges against Cheever to allow federal authorities to prosecute him.
- Federal authorities prosecuted Cheever under the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, and the Federal District Court ordered Cheever to submit to a psychiatric evaluation.
- The federal case was eventually dismissed without prejudice after seven days of jury selection, due to defense counsel's inability to continue.
- Meanwhile, the U.S. Supreme Court held the Kansas death penalty scheme constitutional in Kansas v. Marsh.
- The State of Kansas then brought a second state prosecution against Cheever.
- At trial, the trial court allowed the State to present rebuttal testimony from Dr. Welner, the expert who had conducted the federal court-ordered examination, over defense counsel's objection.
- The jury found Cheever guilty of murder and attempted murder, and at the penalty phase, unanimously voted to impose a death sentence.
- On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court vacated Cheever’s conviction and sentence, agreeing that the State had violated his Fifth Amendment rights by introducing Dr. Welner’s testimony.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Kansas Supreme Court's decision.
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Issue:
Does the Fifth Amendment prohibit the government from using evidence from a court-ordered mental evaluation to rebut a criminal defendant's expert testimony regarding their voluntary intoxication defense, which claims they lacked the requisite specific intent?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Sotomayor
No, the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the government from introducing evidence from a court-ordered mental evaluation to rebut a criminal defendant's expert testimony in support of a voluntary intoxication defense. The Court reaffirmed the rule from Buchanan v. Kentucky, which held that when a defense expert, after examining the defendant, testifies that the defendant lacked the requisite mental state to commit an offense, the prosecution may present psychiatric evidence in rebuttal. This rule is not limited to situations where the evaluation was jointly requested or where state law labels the defense a specific 'affirmative defense.' The Court emphasized that this harmonizes with the principle that a defendant who chooses to testify on certain facts cannot refuse to answer related cross-examination questions. Allowing a defendant to present a one-sided, potentially inaccurate view of their mental state through an expert, without allowing the government to rebut with its own expert testimony, would undermine the adversarial process and the core truth-seeking function of the trial. The Court rejected the Kansas Supreme Court’s reasoning that voluntary intoxication is not a 'mental disease or defect' under state law, clarifying that the relevant phrase under its precedents is the broader term 'mental status,' which encompasses defenses based on psychological expert evidence regarding mens rea, mental capacity, or ability to premeditate, regardless of whether the condition is temporary. The Court declined to address in the first instance whether Dr. Welner’s testimony exceeded the limited rebuttal purpose, leaving that for the state courts to decide on remand.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the permissible scope of rebuttal evidence in criminal trials when a defendant raises a mental status defense. By reaffirming and broadening the Buchanan rule, the Court prevents defendants from strategically using expert testimony to present a one-sided narrative about their mental state without facing counter-evidence from court-ordered evaluations. The decision reinforces the adversarial nature of trials and the truth-seeking function of the courts, ensuring that a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege does not become a shield for potentially misleading expert testimony. This ruling impacts how defendants and prosecutors approach mental status defenses, particularly those involving voluntary intoxication, requiring defendants to weigh the implications of introducing such evidence.
