Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Products Co.
125 Ohio St.3d 250, 2010 Ohio 1027 (2010)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The Ohio General Assembly has the constitutional authority under Sections 34 and 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution to statutorily define and limit the scope of an employer intentional tort cause of action, as these sections are grants of legislative power, not restrictions on it.
Facts:
- Rose Kaminski worked as a press operator for Metal & Wire Products Company.
- On June 30, 2005, the automatic press Kaminski operated ran out of a coil of rolled steel.
- Unable to locate her supervisor, Kaminski enlisted a co-worker to use a forklift to load a new 800-pound, five-foot-tall steel coil.
- To properly load the coil, the co-worker had to set it on the floor and reposition the forklift.
- Kaminski agreed to steady the upright coil by hand while her co-worker moved the forklift.
- While repositioning, the co-worker bumped the coil with the fork, causing it to become unsteady.
- The coil fell onto Kaminski’s legs and feet, causing significant injuries.
- Kaminski applied for and received workers’ compensation benefits for her injuries.
Procedural Posture:
- Rose Kaminski filed a lawsuit in the trial court against Metal & Wire Products Company, alleging an employer intentional tort and challenging the constitutionality of R.C. 2745.01.
- Metal & Wire filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that R.C. 2745.01 is constitutional.
- The trial court granted summary judgment to Metal & Wire, declaring the statute constitutional.
- Subsequently, the trial court granted summary judgment to Metal & Wire on Kaminski’s tort claim, finding she failed to meet the statutory standard.
- Kaminski, as appellant, appealed to the Seventh District Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding R.C. 2745.01 unconstitutional and finding Kaminski had presented sufficient evidence to proceed to trial under the common-law standard.
- The Supreme Court of Ohio accepted a discretionary appeal filed by Metal & Wire Products Company, the appellant, with Kaminski as the appellee.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does Ohio Revised Code 2745.01, which statutorily defines an employer intentional tort as an act committed with the 'deliberate intent to cause an employee to suffer an injury,' violate Sections 34 and 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Cupp, J.
No, R.C. 2745.01 does not violate Sections 34 and 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. The court reasoned that both sections are affirmative grants of legislative authority, not limitations on it. Section 34, authorizing laws for the 'welfare of all employes,' does not prohibit legislation that may impose burdens on employees. Section 35, which establishes the workers' compensation system, only concerns the provision of statutory benefits and does not restrict the legislature's power to define or modify common-law tort actions that fall outside that system. The court distinguished its prior decision in Johnson v. BP Chems., Inc., which struck down a similar statute, by limiting Johnson's 'flawed' constitutional interpretation to the specific, more onerous statute at issue in that case. The current statute is a valid exercise of the General Assembly's power to alter the common law and aligns Ohio with the majority of jurisdictions requiring a showing of deliberate intent to injure for an employer intentional tort.
Dissenting - Pfeifer, J.
Yes, R.C. 2745.01 violates the Ohio Constitution. The dissent argues that the majority should have followed the clear precedent set in Johnson v. BP Chems., Inc., which held that the legislature cannot constitutionally immunize employers from liability for intentional torts. The dissent contends that the current statute is functionally identical to the one struck down in Johnson, as both serve to create an 'illusory' cause of action by requiring proof of deliberate and intentional injury, which is nearly impossible to meet. This decision, in the dissent's view, improperly ends a long-standing judicial protection for workers injured by their employers' intentional misconduct, siding with the legislature's repeated attempts to eliminate this right.
Concurring - Lanzinger, J.
No, the statute is constitutional, but the majority's reasoning is procedurally flawed. The concurring opinion agrees with the majority's ultimate conclusion but criticizes its refusal to explicitly overrule Johnson v. BP Chems., Inc. By merely 'limiting' the prior, wrongly decided case instead of overruling it, the majority avoids a proper stare decisis analysis and creates confusion in the law. The concurrence argues for a more forthright approach to overruling precedent to ensure legal predictability and clarity.
Analysis:
This decision marks a significant shift in Ohio's employer intentional tort jurisprudence, granting substantial deference to the legislature in defining common-law causes of action. By reinterpreting Sections 34 and 35 of the Ohio Constitution as affirmative grants of power rather than limitations, the court reversed a trend of striking down legislative efforts to curtail employer liability. The ruling effectively heightens the standard of proof from the judicially created 'substantial certainty' test to a stricter statutory 'deliberate intent to injure' standard. This change significantly strengthens employer immunity under the workers' compensation system and makes it far more difficult for employees to bring successful tort claims against their employers for workplace injuries.
