Kalina v. Fletcher
139 L. Ed. 2d 471, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 7498, 522 U.S. 118 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
A prosecutor is not entitled to absolute immunity when acting as a complaining witness by personally attesting to the truth of facts in an affidavit supporting an application for an arrest warrant, as this is an investigative function rather than a core advocative function.
Facts:
- Lynne Kalina, a deputy prosecuting attorney in King County, Washington, initiated a criminal proceeding against Rodney Fletcher for the alleged burglary of a school.
- To secure an arrest warrant, Kalina drafted and filed a "Certification for Determination of Probable Cause."
- Kalina personally signed the certification under penalty of perjury, vouching for the truth of the facts presented within the document.
- The certification contained false statements, including that Fletcher had "never been associated with the school" and that an employee of an electronics store had identified Fletcher from a "photo montage."
- In truth, Fletcher had previously installed partitions at the school and was authorized to be there, and the store employee had not identified him.
- Based solely on Kalina's false certification, a trial court found probable cause and issued a warrant for Fletcher's arrest.
- Fletcher was subsequently arrested and held in jail for one day.
- Approximately one month later, the charges against Fletcher were dismissed on the prosecutor's own motion.
Procedural Posture:
- Rodney Fletcher sued Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Lynne Kalina in U.S. District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- Kalina, the defendant, moved for summary judgment, asserting the defense of absolute prosecutorial immunity.
- The District Court (trial court) denied Kalina's motion.
- Kalina, as appellant, appealed the denial to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's ruling, holding that Kalina's actions were not protected by absolute immunity.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted Kalina's petition for a writ of certiorari to resolve a circuit split on the issue.
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Issue:
Does a prosecutor who makes false statements of fact in an affidavit supporting an application for an arrest warrant have absolute immunity from a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stevens
No. A prosecutor does not have absolute immunity for making false statements of fact in an affidavit supporting an arrest warrant because, in doing so, the prosecutor performs the function of a complaining witness, not a judicial advocate. The Court employs a 'functional approach' to immunity, focusing on the nature of the function performed rather than the actor's identity. While core prosecutorial actions, such as initiating a prosecution or appearing in court, are protected by absolute immunity (Imbler v. Pachtman), actions that are investigative or administrative are not. Personally attesting to facts under oath is the function of a witness. This act is analogous to that of a police officer seeking a warrant (Malley v. Briggs), who is only entitled to qualified immunity. The act of swearing to facts is distinct from the protected advocative functions of drafting charging documents or exercising professional judgment about whether to bring a case.
Concurring - Justice Scalia
No. The prosecutor's conduct falls within the functional category of a complaining witness and is therefore not entitled to absolute immunity. This conclusion is correct under the Court's precedent, but the 'functional approach' has created 'curious inversions' of the common law as it existed in 1871. At common law, a prosecutor's decision to bring charges would have been subject to a malicious prosecution suit (akin to qualified immunity), while testimony in a judicial proceeding was absolutely privileged against defamation suits. The Court's modern jurisprudence, starting with Imbler v. Pachtman, has reversed this, granting absolute immunity for the decision to prosecute but only qualified immunity for the act of testifying. Despite this historical inconsistency, the functional approach and its results in cases like Malley v. Briggs are too embedded in § 1983 jurisprudence to abandon, and for reasons of stare decisis, the Court's holding is correct.
Analysis:
This decision refines the scope of prosecutorial immunity by clearly distinguishing between a prosecutor's role as an advocate and their role as an investigator or witness. By denying absolute immunity for personally attesting to facts, the Court holds prosecutors accountable for actions that are functionally equivalent to those of police officers. This reinforces the principle that immunity attaches to the specific function being performed, not the official's title. The ruling creates a brighter line for § 1983 litigation, ensuring a potential remedy for individuals whose Fourth Amendment rights are violated by a prosecutor who steps outside their core advocacy role to act as a fact witness in obtaining an arrest warrant.
