Kahn v. East Side Union High School District
4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 103, 31 Cal. 4th 990, 75 P.3d 30 (2003)
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Rule of Law:
A sports instructor or coach breaches a duty of care to a student only if the instructor intentionally injures the student or engages in conduct that is reckless, in the sense that it is totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in teaching or coaching the sport.
Facts:
- Olivia Kahn, a 14-year-old with no prior competitive swimming experience, joined her high school's junior varsity swim team.
- Kahn had a deep-seated fear of diving into shallow water and communicated this fear to her coach, Andrew McKay.
- McKay assured Kahn that she would not be required to perform a shallow-water racing dive at competitions.
- Kahn alleged that she received no instruction from McKay or other coaching staff on how to safely execute a shallow-water dive.
- Minutes before a swim meet, McKay informed Kahn that she would have to perform a racing dive, breaking his earlier promise.
- When Kahn objected due to fear and lack of training, McKay insisted, threatening to remove her from the meet or the team if she refused.
- Without direct coaching supervision, Kahn attempted several practice dives from a starting block into the shallow pool.
- On her third practice dive, Kahn struck the bottom of the pool and broke her neck.
Procedural Posture:
- Olivia Kahn, through her guardian ad litem, sued the East Side Union High School District and coach Andrew McKay in a state trial court for negligence.
- Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the doctrine of primary assumption of risk barred Kahn's claim.
- The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
- Kahn, as appellant, appealed the judgment to the California Court of Appeal.
- The Court of Appeal, in a split decision, affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants (appellees).
- Kahn petitioned the Supreme Court of California for review, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does the doctrine of primary assumption of risk bar a claim against a high school swim coach for a student's injury when the coach allegedly failed to provide instruction for a dangerous maneuver, broke a promise not to require the maneuver, and then insisted the student perform it under threat of being removed from competition?
Opinions:
Majority - George, C.J.
No. The doctrine of primary assumption of risk does not bar the claim because there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the coach's conduct was reckless. While the standard of care for a sports instructor is not one of ordinary negligence, an instructor can be liable for conduct that is reckless, meaning it is totally outside the range of ordinary coaching activity. The court reasoned that imposing liability for ordinary negligence would chill a coach's ability to challenge and push athletes to improve, which is a fundamental part of coaching. However, the totality of the circumstances alleged by Kahn—including the complete lack of instruction in a known dangerous maneuver, the coach's awareness of her intense fear, lulling her into a false sense of security with a promise, and then breaking that promise with a last-minute coercive threat—creates a triable issue of fact for a jury to determine whether the coach's conduct was reckless and fell completely outside the bounds of ordinary coaching.
Concurring - Werdegar, J.
Yes, I agree with the result, but the standard should be understood as gross negligence. The term 'reckless' as used in some legal contexts implies a willful or wanton disregard for a known high probability of harm, which may be too high a standard for a coach. A standard of 'gross negligence' or an 'extreme departure from the instructional norms' better captures the duty a coach owes to a student. This standard still protects coaches from liability for ordinary judgment calls while holding them accountable for extreme lapses in care that are not an inherent risk of school athletics.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Kennard, J.
Yes, I agree with reversing the summary judgment, but for a different reason: the correct legal standard should be ordinary negligence, not recklessness. Extending the recklessness standard from sports coparticipants to professional coaches of minor students is a mistake. Coaches are instructors entrusted with the safety of children and should be held to the same standard of reasonable care as other teachers, such as a shop or chemistry instructor. The majority's recklessness standard dangerously de-prioritizes student safety and wrongly absolves coaches of the legal obligation to use reasonable care when training novice athletes.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the standard of care applicable to sports instructors and coaches in California, extending the recklessness standard from Knight v. Jewett beyond coparticipants. The decision balances the need to allow coaches to 'push' athletes without fear of liability for ordinary negligence against the need to protect students from egregious behavior. By defining a coach's reckless conduct as that which is 'totally outside the range of the ordinary activity' of coaching, the court provides a high bar for liability but affirms that one exists. Future cases will likely focus on what combination of factors—such as lack of instruction, coercion, and disregard for safety protocols—is sufficient to create a triable issue of fact under this heightened recklessness standard.
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