Justin Hodges v. Amy Hodges
2015 WL 7432591, 2015 La. LEXIS 2501, 181 So. 3d 700 (2015)
Rule of Law:
Louisiana Revised Statute 9:335 prohibits the designation of 'co-domiciliary parents' in a joint child custody arrangement, mandating that only one parent can be designated as the domiciliary parent or that a joint custody implementation order must comprehensively allocate both physical custody and legal authority and responsibility without such a designation. A judgment failing to validly allocate legal authority and responsibility cannot serve as a proper joint custody implementation order.
Facts:
- Justin Hodges and Amy Hodges married in Ascension Parish on January 22, 2011, and established their matrimonial domicile in Livingston Parish.
- One child, M.H., was born of the marriage on June 25, 2012.
- On May 28, 2014, Justin Hodges instituted divorce proceedings in Livingston Parish.
- Both Justin and Amy sought joint custody of M.H. and requested to be designated as the child's domiciliary parent.
- Prior to the trial court hearing, Justin and Amy had been sharing equal physical custody of M.H. and making all decisions regarding the child jointly without reported disagreements.
Procedural Posture:
- Justin Hodges instituted divorce proceedings against Amy Hodges in Livingston Parish trial court.
- After a hearing, the trial court granted joint custody, ordered equal weekly physical custody, and designated both Justin and Amy as 'co-domiciliary parents.'
- Amy Hodges appealed the trial court's decision to the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal, arguing the 'co-domiciliary' designation was unauthorized and seeking to be named sole domiciliary parent.
- The appellate court affirmed the 'co-domiciliary' designation but ruled that no valid joint custody implementation order had been rendered and remanded the case for the entry of such an order (Hodges v. Hodges, 14-1575 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/6/15), 166 So.3d 348).
- Amy Hodges applied for a writ of certiorari to the Louisiana Supreme Court (Hodges v. Hodges, 15-0585 (La.5/15/15), 169 So.3d 380).
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Issue:
Does Louisiana Revised Statute 9:335 permit a court to designate both parents as 'co-domiciliary parents' in a joint child custody arrangement, and if not, does a trial court's judgment that makes such a designation and allocates physical custody and some financial responsibilities, but not comprehensive legal authority, constitute a valid joint custody implementation order?
Opinions:
Majority - Weimer, Justice
No, Louisiana Revised Statute 9:335 does not permit the designation of 'co-domiciliary parents,' and a trial court's judgment making such a designation while failing to comprehensively allocate legal authority and responsibility does not constitute a valid joint custody implementation order. The court reasoned that the plain language of La. R.S. 9:335(B)(2) defines 'The domiciliary parent' as 'the parent with whom the child shall primarily reside,' using the singular and logically precluding two domiciliary parents. The statutory framework, including the presumption of authority for the domiciliary parent in La. R.S. 9:335(B)(3), is structured for a single domiciliary parent, avoiding uncertainty and conflict. While general statutory interpretation allows singular words to include the plural (La. R.S. 1:7), 'domiciliary parent' is a specialized term whose specific definition in La. R.S. 9:335(B)(2) logically excludes a plural interpretation. The court emphasized that the legislature provided the 'joint custody implementation order' (La. R.S. 9:335(A)) as the proper mechanism to allocate both physical custody (A)(2)(a) and legal authority and responsibility (A)(3), allowing for flexible arrangements without an unauthorized 'co-domiciliary' label. The trial court's judgment failed to 'allocate the legal authority and responsibility of the parents' as required by La. R.S. 9:335(A)(3), making it an insufficient implementation order. The court resolved conflicting appellate court jurisprudence by holding that La. R.S. 9:335 unequivocally requires only one domiciliary parent, and remanded the case for a prompt hearing consistent with this interpretation.
Dissenting - Hughes, J.
Yes, Louisiana Revised Statute 9:335 allows for the designation of 'co-domiciliary parents' when it is in the best interest of the child, especially when an implementation order directs equal sharing of physical and legal custody. The trial court’s judgment, in this context, effectively constituted a valid implementation order. Justice Hughes argued that La. R.S. 9:335(B)(1) allows for exceptions to designating a single domiciliary parent when there is an 'implementation order to the contrary or for other good cause shown,' which the trial court's arrangement for equal custody satisfied. The dissent relied on general statutory construction rules (La. C.C. art. 3506 and La. R.S. 1:7) that allow singular terms to include the plural, concluding 'domiciliary parent' could be read as 'domiciliary parents' in the absence of an explicit prohibition. The dissent posited that 'shared custody' (La. R.S. 9:315.9), involving approximately equal time with each parent, effectively creates two primary residences, thus making 'co-domiciliary parents' a logical and non-oxymoronic designation. Prohibiting this designation deprives courts of a necessary tool to ensure equal legal authority. It also argued that if no domiciliary parent is named, La. R.S. 9:335(C) defaults to Civil Code Title VII, which historically favored paternal authority (La. C.C. art. 216), thereby potentially disadvantaging mothers. The dissent noted that a 'co-domiciliary' designation encourages cooperation and that the trial court's decision, aiming for continuity in M.H.'s best interest, should be given deference, as a literal interpretation barring 'co-domiciliary parents' leads to an absurd result hindering full shared legal custody.
Concurring - Knoll, J.
No, La. R.S. 9:335 does not permit the designation of 'co-domiciliary parents,' and the majority's interpretation is sound. Justice Knoll agreed with the majority that the plain language of La. R.S. 9:335(B)(2) clearly defines 'the domiciliary parent' as 'the parent with whom the child shall primarily reside,' and references 'the other parent,' unequivocally indicating a single domiciliary parent. The term 'co-domiciliary' does not appear in Louisiana statutes. The concurrence countered the dissent by explaining that the joint custody implementation order (La. R.S. 9:335(A)) already provides courts with the power to allocate both physical custody (A)(2)(a) and legal authority and responsibility (A)(3), making the 'co-domiciliary' term unnecessary and contrary to legislative intent. It cited other statutes (La. R.S. 9:315.8 and 9:315.9) that consistently refer to a single 'domiciliary' or 'nondomiciliary' parent, even in joint custody, and contemplate situations where no domiciliary parent is designated rather than two. The concurrence also corrected the dissent's reliance on the repealed La. C.C. art. 216, noting that the new version would not automatically grant fathers prevailing authority. Finally, Justice Knoll emphasized that legal scholar Katherine Spaht considered the term 'co-domiciliary parents' 'oxymoronic,' and asserted that any shift toward fully shared legal custody as a policy matter should be left to the legislature, not judicial fiat.
Analysis:
This case clarifies a significant ambiguity in Louisiana child custody law regarding the designation of 'domiciliary parents' in joint custody arrangements. By definitively prohibiting 'co-domiciliary parents,' the Louisiana Supreme Court ensures statutory consistency and reduces potential legal uncertainty and conflict for parents and courts. The ruling emphasizes the importance of a comprehensive 'joint custody implementation order' to clearly delineate parental legal authority and responsibility, even when physical custody is shared equally. This decision provides clear guidance for trial courts, streamlining the process of establishing stable and predictable custody arrangements, and is likely to lead to more detailed and explicit implementation orders to define decision-making authority.
